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Rules governing the relationship between judge and jury are some of
the most important in any piece of litigation. The allocation of issues to
judge or jury determines who will ultimately decide the case. Rules relating

to sufficiency of the evidence determine whether the case will even go to
the jury. Commentators have long maintained that judge-jury rules are
solely matters of federal law, even in cases where state law provides the
rule of decision.' This view relies not on the Seventh Amendment, but instead on a single, old Supreme Court case, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,Inc., which purportedly establishes an enclave of federal
law around the judge-jury relationship.2
This article challenges the conventional wisdom, and shows that under
standard Erie principles, state law should exert meaningful influence in the
judge-jury area. In a relatively recent decision-Gasperiniv. Center for
Humanities, Inc.-the Supreme Court held that the standard for granting a
new trial, on the ground of excessive compensatory damages, is provided
by state law.3 Because the Court held that this crucial judge-jury issue is

* Robinson, Bradshaw, & Hinson, P.A.
1. See, e.g., 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2303 (3d ed. 2008) ("After the decisions handed down by the Supreme Court
in the line of cases discussed above, the complete dominance of federal law in the area of
jury trial rights clearly had been established."); id. at § 2525 ("[A] federal test controls the
sufficiency of the evidence on a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law . .
2.
See 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
3. 518 U.S. 415,419 (1996).
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governed by state law, it is no longer possible to assert that federal law has
a monopoly in the judge-jury field.
Yet courts and commentators have, to this point, failed to integrate
Gasperini into theories of the judge-jury relationship in diversity cases.4 In
the first Part of this article, I rectify this deficiency in the literature. Gasperini proves that courts should normally apply the standard Hanna "twinaims" test to determine whether a state judge-jury rule should control in
federal court. Under that test, the state rule applies whenever a divergent
federal rule would induce forum-shopping or result in the inequitable administration of the law. I read Byrd as, at most, a constitutional avoidance
opinion, warranting use of a federal rule that violates the twin aims of Erie
only if the state rule would be constitutionally problematic in federal court.
My approach harmonizes Byrd and Gasperini,and provides a workable test
for courts to use when encountering judge-jury issues in cases governed by
state law.
In Parts II and III, I apply this framework to two practical problems:
sufficiency of the evidence and allocation of issues to a judge or jury. Part
II shows that federal courts must normally adhere to state court decisions on
sufficiency of the evidence: sometimes as a matter of federal constitutional
law, and in many other cases under Hanna's twin-aims test. Part III then
shows that state law should often control the allocation of issues to judge or
jury. Though the Seventh Amendment obviously requires trial by jury
where it applies, it leaves plenty of ground uncovered, which is where state
law should play a meaningful role under standard Erie principles.
In both of these Parts, I demonstrate that many federal appellate decisions have already given state law binding force in the judge-jury arena.
The existence of these cases demonstrates that the supposed hegemony of
federal law is not only theoretically unsound, but it is also an inaccurate
description of current practice.
In short, I aim to show that, contrary to perceived wisdom, judge-jury
rules are not immune from Erie principles that prevail everywhere else. Not
only is this effort theoretically interesting, it is also essential if important
state policies are to receive the full measure of protection that the Erie doctrine promises. The state rule in Gasperiniwas part of a tort reform effort in
New York. If similar efforts are to be fully successful, the federal courts
must shed their instinctive resistance to the influence of state law in this
area.

4.
Throughout this article, I use "diversity" as shorthand for all heads of federal
jurisdiction where state law provides the rule of decision and Erie principles govern, including, for example, supplemental jurisdiction.
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I.
A.

ERIE, GASPERIN, AND THE JUDGE-JURY RELATIONSHIP

THE STANDARD ERIE FRAMEWORK

To understand state law's proper role in the judge-jury field, one must
first take a short tour through the hallowed halls of the Erie doctrine.' As
John Hart Ely recognized long ago, the "Erie doctrine" is really a collection
of rules, all pertaining to the law applied in federal cases governed by state
law. 6 These rules have three main sources: the Constitution, the Rules of
Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act.7
Erie itself relied on the Constitution. 8 For a century before Erie, the
Court's decision in Swift v. Tyson 9 had allowed federal courts to reach independent decisions on issues of state common law.' 0 Federal judges used
this power to elaborate a field of "general common law" that applied only
in federal diversity cases. The Swift doctrine may have been motivated in
part by hopes for a uniform national common law; however, by 1938, it was
clear that this hope was ill-founded as state courts persisted in adhering to
rules that diverged from general common law." In the opening pages of
Erie, the Court noted that the persistence of two systems of substantive law
within single states had created considerable inequity:
Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by noncitizens against citizens. It made rights enjoyed under the unwritten "general law" vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court; and the
privilege of selecting the court in which the right should be
determined was conferred upon the noncitizen.12

(1974).

5.
6.

See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 698

7.
See id.
8.
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79.
9.
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
10.
See generally Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
11.
One of the most notorious instances of a promulgation of general law in the
years before Erie was, ironically, Justice Holmes's own opinion in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goodman, where he held that a driver was contributorily negligent as a matter of
law if he did not stop his car, get out, look, and listen at a railroad crossing. Id. at 69-70.
Holmes's attempt to reify negligence law at the railroad crossing met with no success in the
state courts and was limited to its facts in less than a decade (before Erie) in an opinion
written by Justice Cardozo. Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 106 (1934).
12.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.
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The facts of Erie potentially provided an example of such inequity. 3
Mr. Tompkins, while walking along a rail bed, had been hit by a hook protruding from a train. 14 He brought suit in federal court, where he contended
that the railroad was liable for negligence under the general common law,
rendering consultation of Pennsylvania law unnecessary. 15 The railroad
countered by arguing that under applicable state law, it only had a duty to
avoid willful and wanton behavior toward Mr. Tompkins. 16 The lower
courts had accepted Mr. Tompkins's position on general common law
grounds,' 7 but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the elaboration of
rules of conduct,
in disregard of state cases, was error of constitutional
8
magnitude.'
The constitutional holding was essential to the judgment, because the
Court expressed reluctance to overturn a century-old decision on any other
basis.' 9 But the reasoning was admittedly cryptic. Many lawyers erroneously believe that the constitutional holding relied on equal protection. Yet
the statement that Swift had "rendered impossible equal protection of the
law" was contained in the earlier discussion of the inequities produced by
that decision (what later became known in Hanna as the "policy" of Erie),20
not in the section explicating the constitutional holding.2' The constitutional
holding in Erie was more structural than textual, and focused principally on
whether Congress could have abrogated the Pennsylvania rule at issue.22
The Court gave a negative answer:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be
declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest
court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There
is no federal general common law. Congress has no power
13.
See id. at 69.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co. (Erie1), 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937), rev'd, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
17.
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 70; see also Erie 1, 90 F.2d at 605-06.
18.
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 80.
19.
See id. at 77-78. For example, the Court declined to characterize its decision as
a different interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act (part of the Judiciary Act of 1789),
because it was unwilling to overrule Swift merely on a difference of statutory interpretation.
See id. at 77.
20.
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965).
21.
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 75-77.
22.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITTIONAL LAW § 1-13 (3d ed. 2000)
(defining the Constitution's structure as "that which the text shows but does not directly
say").
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to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
state whether they be local in their nature or "general," be
they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no
clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power
upon the federal courts....

Thus the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice
Holmes said, "an unconstitutional assumption of powers by
the Courts of the United States which no lapse of time or
respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct." . . . [I]n applying the doctrine this Court and the
lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are
reserved by the Constitution to the several states.2
Did the Court simply mean that a Congress of enumerated powers has
no power at all to displace certain rules of state substantive law, and so the
courts do not have that authority either? It is obviously true that Congress
does not have plenary regulatory power; that much is clear from the Court's
recent Commerce Clause decisions, which indicate that meaningful constraints on Congress's general regulatory authority still exist, even after the
unprecedented expansion of that authority in the 193 Os. 24 But this reading is
ultimately unsatisfactory. The areas where Congress cannot regulate at all
are still quite limited, and Congress undoubtedly has the power to displace
many fields currently covered by state common law. If Erie only imposed a
constitutional restraint where Congress could not legislate at all, it was a
weak decision indeed. This reading would potentially leave the federal
courts with substantial authority to elaborate general common law that applies in the federal courts but not in the state courts, contrary to Erie's
sweeping statement that "[t]here is no federal general common law. 25
The better reading is that Erie is a prohibition on half-measures: Congress may not abrogate state substantive law with rules that apply only in
the federal courts. Instead, if Congress wishes to legislate substantive rules,
it must createfederal legislation that applies in both state and federal court,
rather than purported state legislation that applies in diversity cases but
does not bind the state courts. The "halfway" rules produce the glaring inequities set out in the opening pages of the Erie opinion: a second system of
23.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79 (emphasis added) (quoting Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928)).
24. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
25.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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law that applies only to cases in the federal courts because of the accident
of diverse citizenship.26 Federal general common law decisions had in fact
produced such inequities.2 7 Such divergence was not necessary or proper to
the functioning of an independent federal diversity forum.
This "half measures" reading of Erie is the better one because it explains why there is no "federal general common law."28 The Constitution
prohibits substantive lawmaking that applies only in cases that find their
way into the federal courts. Because federal courts can only
make law in
29
federal cases, there can be no general federal common law.
Subsequent cases have continued to recognize this domain of state
rules that not even Congress may selectively abrogate: namely, "substantive" rules and rules "bound up with" state substance.3 ° One of these cases
is Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.-the case most often
cited to support the view that federal law is supreme in the judge-jury
area. 3 We thus arrive at the first reason to doubt that federal law has a mo26. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 75 ("[T]he doctrine [of Swift v. Tyson] rendered impossible equal protection of the law. In attempting to promote uniformity of law throughout the
United States, the doctrine had prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the
state.").
27.
See id.at 78. One might rejoin that the federal courts do not have the authority
to make common law wherever Congress has the power to regulate, as a matter of separation
of powers. But while that may be true, that is not how Justice Brandeis framed the reasoning
in Erie, so it is an unsatisfactory explanation of his statement that "there is no federal general
common law." Id. Brandeis instead focused on Congress's power and treated the limitation
on federal court authority as derived from the limitation on Congress. The "halfway rules"
reading of Erie thus better explains the Court's statement that there is no general common
law.
28.
Id.
29.
My interpretation of Erie's constitutional holding is obviously indebted to
Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-andof the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 383, 394-97 (1964).
30. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198,
203 (1956).
The constitutional holding applies most obviously to traditional substance: rules
of conduct and the like. A traditional substantive rule is "a right granted for one or more
nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or
efficiency of the litigation process." Ely, supra note 6, at 725. A traditional procedural rule
is "one designed to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the
resolution of disputes." Id. at 724. As discussed later in this article, the substance Erie extends beyond traditional substance because of the Rules of Decision Act. See discussion
infra Part I.D.
31.
See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536; see also Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the
State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1637, 1647 (1998) (arguing that Byrd "leaves
no doubt" that Erie "requires the federal court to adhere" to rules that define rights and obligations or that are "bound up" with such rules, because "[iun this area, there is no consideration of outcome determination, no assessment of federal interests, and no balancing").
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nopoly over judge-jury rules. If a state judge-jury rule is "substantive" or
"bound up with" state substance, then even Byrd recognizes it must control
as a matter of federal constitutional law. 32 We will soon see that some state
judge-jury rules fall within this category.3 3
Moving beyond Erie's constitutional holding, Congress does have the
power to regulate practice and procedure in diversity cases that is derived
from its Article III power to establish the lower federal courts, as well as
the Necessary and Proper Clause.34 The line between this power and Erie's
constitutional prohibition was implicated by the Rules Enabling Act (REA),
in which Congress authorized the Supreme Court to "prescribe general rules
of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United
States district courts ...

and courts of appeals. 3 5 The Court has used this

authority, most notably, by promulgating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Inevitably, the Court had to consider whether, in a diversity case, a
Federal Rule authorized by the REA should trump contrary state procedure.36

Hanna v. Plumer involved a conflict between the state service of process rule and Federal Rule 4: the plaintiff had complied with Rule 4 but not

with the state rule.37 The Court upheld the Federal Rule,38 and in the course

of so holding, recognized substantial Congressional power over practice
and procedure in diversity cases. 39 The Court held that a Federal Rule prevails whenever authorized by the REA, 40 and a Federal Rule is authorized
whenever it covers "matters which, though falling within the uncertain area

32.
See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536. The difference between "substantive" rules and rules
"bound up with" state substance has never been made completely clear. The chief candidates
for rights bound up with substance are those procedural rights intimately related to the rights
given by the state's primary law, including the state's burden of proof and choice of law
rules. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1943); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 495-97 (1941).
33.
See infra Part III. This does raise the possibility of a clash of the titans between
the Seventh Amendment and Erie's constitutional holding. Where the state allocates a question to the judge, the allocation is bound up with substantive rights, but the Seventh
Amendment arguably requires a jury trial.
34.
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472 ("[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court
system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power
to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a
power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance
and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.").
35.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
36.
See Hanna,380 U.S. at 461.
37.
Id. at 461-62.
38.
Id. at 474.
39.
See id. at 471-74.
40.
See id.
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between,41substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as
either."
Of course, Congress could not, by enacting the REA, infringe on the
domain of state rules protected by Erie's constitutional holding. Both the
REA and Hanna recognized this limitation. 42 The REA states that the Fed43
eral Rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.,
Then, Hanna recognized that when a question is "'substantive' in every
traditional sense," "neither Congress nor the federal courts can, under the
guise of formulating rules of decision for federal courts, fashion rules which
are not supported by a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or
some other section of the Constitution." 44 Accordingly, after Hanna, it is
still the case that neither Congress nor the courts may selectively displace
core state substance, or rules "bound up with" state substance, with "halfway" federal rules. But a statute or Federal Rule may displace state procedural rules essentially at will.
With state law plainly ascendant within Erie's constitutional zone, and
federal law almost always ascendant within the REA zone, the interesting
Erie questions now arise with state rules not classifiable as traditional substance, but also not covered by any statute or Federal Rule. Here, Congress
could hypothetically authorize a federal rule that diverges from state law
(because the state rule would be "rationally classifiable" as procedure) but
has chosen not to, and no Federal Rule covering the issue has been promulgated. Federal courts might conceivably have the authority to elaborate
divergent federal procedural common law on their own if there were no
statute instructing otherwise. But there is such a statute: the Rules of Decision Act (RDA). 45 Here, Congress provided that "[t]he laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts
41.
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472. John Hart Ely, who clerked for Warren at the time he
wrote Hanna, argued that a statute can be justified by the merest procedural rationale. See
Ely, supra note 6, at 707-08. For example, Congress would have the authority to enact nofault liability instead of negligence liability for case-management reasons, or could adopt a
clear and convincing standard instead of a preponderance standard to prevent jury confusion.
Id. at 706 n.77. Ely argued that these modifications could still not be accomplished by a
Federal Rule because of the substantive rights limitation in the REA. Id. In my view, Ely's
argument proves too much, because it would allow Congress to abrogate the rule at issue in
Erie (say, for case-management reasons); a result that is inconsistent with the holding of that
case. See infra Part III.
42. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
43.
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). The substantive rights limitation may or may not be
coextensive with the constitutional holding of Erie. If it is more expansive than Erie's constitutional holding, then Congress has not delegated the entirety of its rulemaking authority
in the REA. This dispute is largely immaterial to the issues treated in this article, and I will
not discuss it further.
44.
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72.
45.
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
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of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply." 46 The RDA means that, rather than having free reign to adopt the
procedures that seem best to them, the federal courts must ask: how much
conformity with state practice does the RDA require, and how much room
does it leave for federal courts to elaborate rules that conflict with state
law? These are root questions of statutory interpretation.
The Court's original answer to the RDA riddle was the "outcome determination" test of Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York.47 Under this
test, the state rule controlled whenever use of the federal rule would produce a significantly different outcome. 4 This test, if applied uncritically,
would have created a near-hegemony of state practice in the RDA zone,
because any difference in rules would likely affect the outcome of the litigation. 49 For example, even a deadline for filing a brief is outcome determinative at the time of application if the federal deadline is shorter. 50 The
Court soon came to believe that this test was too crude and broad because it
protected state practice in situations that did not implicate the policies embodied in Erie and the RDA.5 1
Accordingly, in Hanna, the Court adopted the reading of the RDA that
still prevails today.52 The Court concluded that state practice controls in the
RDA zone whenever divergence would implicate the inequities discussed in
the first "policy" section of Erie:
The Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization that it
would be unfair for the character of result of a litigation
materially to differ because the suit had been brought in a
federal court.

Not only are nonsubstantial, or trivial, variations
not likely to raise the sort of equal protection problems
which troubled the Court in Erie; they are also unlikely to
influence the choice of a forum. The "outcomedetermination" test therefore cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of
46.

Id.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.at 109.
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
Id.at 468-69.
See id. at 468-72.
Id. at 467-68.

47.

326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.53
Hanna thus announced the "twin-aims" test for RDA questions.54 If federal
and state rules differ, the federal rule wins only if it will not violate the
"twin aims" of Erie, which Hanna identified as discouraging vertical forum-shopping and ensuring the equitable administration of the laws.55 By
contrast, if the divergence in procedure is not significant enough to implicate the twin aims, then federal courts may follow federal practice.5 6
Hanna's twin-aims test extends beyond Erie's constitutional holding,
because it requires conformity in areas where Congress could legislate a
different rule for the federal courts. But the test does not extend as far as
York, because it does not require federal courts to conform to insignificant
aspects of state practice.57
As a result, Erie and Hanna marked out at least four kinds of state
rules: (1) those that bind as a matter of constitutional law; (2) those that are
validly displaced by an on-point Federal Rule; (3) those that implicate twin
aims and trump a contrary federal rule; and (4) those that do not implicate
twin aims, leaving the federal courts free to adopt a contrary rule.

53.

Id.
Hanna,380 U.S. at 468.
55.
Id. Arguably, the twin-aims test was simply a modified version of the outcomedetermination test, with the focus of the analysis shifted from the time the rule is applied to
the commencement of the lawsuit, focusing on whether a reasonable litigant would perceive
a material difference between the forums. See Ely, supra note 6, at 714 ("[According to the
Hanna test,] a federal court may adhere to its own rules in diversity cases insofar, but only
insofar, as they are neither materially more or less difficult for the burdened party to comply
with than their state counterparts, nor likely to generate an outcome different from that
which would result were the case litigated in the state court system and the state rules followed."); see also Freer, supra note 31, at 1652 (arguing that Hanna's innovation on outcome determination was to shift focus to the outset of the case, away from the time the rule
is applied, and that it did this by focusing on forum-selection decisions and inequitable administration of the laws).
56. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470.
57.
Because Hanna ultimately relied on the REA, the RDA discussion was, strictly
speaking, dicta. But Hanna's RDA test has been followed in every Supreme Court RDA
case since then and has, thus, achieved the status of a holding. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437 (1996); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 34
(1991); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6 (1988); see also Sun Oil Co.
v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726-27 (1988) (citing Hanna, not Byrd, when describing the
RDA test).

54.
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B.

BYRD

Where do judge-jury rules fit within this standard Erie framework?
Federal Rules cover some of the ground, for example, in Rules 5058 and
56. 59 The Seventh Amendment obviously controls within its sphere (except
perhaps where that would conflict with Erie's constitutional holding). On
the other hand, if a state judge-jury rule is substantive or bound up with
substance, then it controls under Erie's constitutional holding.
Most questions in this area, however, likely fall within the RDA zone
because they are neither traditionally substantive nor covered by a statute or
Federal Rule. An example, treated in detail in Part II, is the sufficiency of
the evidence going to a historical fact such as causation. And in this RDA
zone, the Hanna twin-aims test would frequently indicate use of the state
rule. Divergence in such important strategic areas would most often cause
forum-shopping and inequity.
This analysis is, however, complicated by a case that predates Hanna:
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,Inc.60 In Byrd, the plaintiff,
an electric line worker injured on the job, sued the electric company for
negligence. 6' The electric company argued that it was the worker's "statutory employer," which meant he should be required to seek exclusive redress from the worker's compensation system. 62 In South Carolina, the
judge decided the "statutory employer" issue, as well as disputed historical
facts relevant to that issue.63
The lower federal courts, applying York's outcome determination test,
had followed state practice and decided the statutory employer issue, as
well as disputed historical facts, without a jury.64 The Supreme Court held
that this was error.6 5 The Court first observed that the state practice was not
"substantive" or "bound up with" state substantive law, but was "merely a
form and mode of enforcing the immunity," and therefore did not fall
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

FED. R. Civ. P. 50.

FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
356 U.S. 525 (1958).
Id.at 526-27.
Id. at 527.

Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Byrd, 238 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1956), rev'd,

356 U.S. 525 (1958).
64. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 527-29.
Id. at 540. The Court's opinion did not make clear whether the lower courts
65.

erred only by deciding the disputed factual issues, or whether they also erred by applying the

"statutory employer" standard to the facts of the case (i.e., deciding the mixed question). In

fact, after Byrd, the Fourth Circuit continued to hold that the court was to apply "statutory

employer" to the facts, consistent with state practice. See Corollo v. S.S. Kresge Co., 456

F.2d 306, 313 (4th Cir. 1972); Walker v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 270 F.2d 857, 860 (4th Cir.
1959).
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within Erie's constitutional holding. 66 The Byrd Court seemed to think that
the state's allocation was purely accidental: because the issue normally
came up on appeal from the administrative agency, the state courts treated
"statutory employer," and related facts, as a jurisdictional issue for the court
67
to be decided without a jury.
The Court next acknowledged that the York test (the then-prevailing
test for RDA questions) pointed toward use of the state rule, because outcomes may differ (all things being equal) if the state courts use a judge and
the federal courts use a jury. 68 The Court, nevertheless, held that the outcome determination test was not dispositive:
[T]here are affirmative countervailing considerations at
work here. The federal system is an independent system for
administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its
jurisdiction. An essential characteristic of that system is the
manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions between judge and jury and, under the
influence-if not the command-of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to
the jury.69

The Court disclaimed reliance on the Seventh Amendment itself.70 Instead,
it held that "there is a strong federal policy against allowing state rules to
disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts," a policy sufficient
to overcome the potential outcome disparity produced by following the
federal rule. 7' At the close of the analysis, the Court took pains to downplay
the potential for outcome disparity, noting that it was mitigated by federal
jury control practices, including directed verdict, new trial, and the federal
judge's ability to comment on the evidence.72
How does one harmonize the RDA analysis in Byrd with the test later
announced in Hanna? It is possible (perhaps likely) that they do not conflict
at all. That is, Byrd might simply represent an early example of twin-aims
analysis in the specific context of the judge-jury relationship. Like Hanna,
Byrd acknowledged that York-style outcome determination was too crude
and was insufficiently attentive to the policies behind Erie or the RDA.
Byrd also spent considerable effort downplaying the potential for outcome
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536.
Id.
Id. at 537.
Id.
Id. at 537 n.10.
Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538.
Id. at 539-40.
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disparity by noting that jury control devices in federal court would minimize disparity: "[C]learly there is not present here the certainty that a different result would follow ...or even the strong possibility that this would
be the case. 73 Arguably, Byrd simply recognized that allocation of the
"statutory employer" issue to the jury, rather than the judge, would not violate the purpose of Erie, because the limited disparity (much of it unpredictable) on this threshold issue would not affect the forum decision or produce any inequity. Viewed in this light, the language about the "independent" federal system and the "strong federal policy against allowing state
rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship" 74 were simply restating, in the
specific context of a judge-jury rule, what Hanna later held as a general
matter: the federal courts are an independent system for administering justice whose procedural rules are normally supported by good and substantial
reasons, and those rules should not be quickly discarded in the absence of
forum-shopping or inequity.
On this reading, Byrd was simply Hanna writ small, a tentative step
away from York and toward the full-fledged twin-aims test, which just happened to take place in the judge-jury field. The analysis was arguably consistent with twin-aims analysis, because disregarding the state rule likely
did not induce forum-shopping or cause real inequity. Support for this interpretation is found in Hanna itself.75 Hanna purported to establish a comprehensive RDA test, applicable to all q1uestions in the RDA zone, including, presumably, judge-jury questions. In the course of establishing that
comprehensive test, Hanna folded Byrd into the justification, citing Byrd
for the proposition that "[o]utcome-determination analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman. Indeed, the message of York itself is that
choices between state and federal law are to be made not by application of
any automatic, 'litmus paper' criterion, but rather by reference to the policies underlying the Erie rule." 77 This identification of Byrd with "the policies underlying the Erie rule" tends to indicate that the Hanna majority did
consider Byrd to be simply a more particular instance of the twin-aims test
set forth in Hanna.78 Further, there is no indication
in the later Hanna opin79
ion that Byrd supplied a competing RDA test.
Yet, somewhat surprisingly, Byrd has not traditionally been understood as an early application of twin aims. Instead of folding Byrd into
Hanna, most commentators have read Byrd to provide a competing test.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.at 538.
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-67 (1965).

77.

Id. (citation omitted).

76.
78.
79.

Id.

See id. at 467.

See id. at 466-67.
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They believe Byrd shows that a federal procedural common law rule may
sometimes prevail over a contrary state rule, even if that divergence violates
twin aims. They commonly characterize the Byrd alternative as a balancing
test, which calls upon a federal court to weigh the federal interest against
the state interest and the potential for outcome disparity.8 °
This "balancing" interpretation of Byrd is no more or less plausible
than the "Byrd as a subset of Hanna" interpretation. The deciding fact
would be whether or not the limited outcome disparity produced by following the federal rule in Byrd would have violated twin aims; however, because Byrd preceded Hanna, the Byrd Court did not answer the question.81
There are, however, good theoretical and practical reasons to resist the
"balancing" interpretation of Byrd and favor the "Hanna writ small" interpretation. In the first place, how can there be two simultaneously existing,
competing interpretations of a single federal statute, the RDA? The laterdecided Hanna announced the definitive interpretation, which has been
followed in every Supreme Court RDA case since.82 If that is the proper
interpretation of the RDA, then how can an "important" or even "essential"
federal interest identified by a federal court outweigh Congress's command
to follow the state rule where divergence would violate twin aims?
This theoretical concern is as present in the judge-jury area as it is in
other areas of federal procedural law. Recall that Byrd is relevant only in
the RDA zone, where no constitutional provision or federal statute (other
than the RDA) applies. The "federal interest" behind the judge-jury rule can
therefore only be a product of federal common law. But how can a federal
common law rule trump a twin-aims violation when Congress has mandated
conformity in twin-aims situations? Indeed, because judge-jury rules are so
important, state rules in this area will often implicate twin aims, raising this
difficulty again and again.
In addition to this theoretical difficulty, there is the practical problem
of determining when a federal interest is "important" enough to potentially
trump a twin-aims violation. One answer appeals to the language of Byrd,
and says that any "essential characteristic" of the federal system triggers
application of Byrd's alternative test. Of course, labeling a characteristic as
"essential" does not solve the theoretical difficulty: how, if twin aims are
violated, a purportedly "essential" characteristic identified by a federal
court can trump Congress's will.
Further, "essentialism" is unsatisfactory as a practical trigger for the
Byrd test. What are the "essential" characteristics of a federal court that
distinguish it from a state court; apart from constitutionally mandated fea80.
81.
82.

See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536-40 (1958).
Id.
See Freer,supra note 31, at 1652.
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tures such as life tenure for judges, the Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial, and statutory features mandated by Congress? A state court is certainly no less of a "court" than a federal court. In fact, state courts are arguably just as much "federal" courts as federal courts are. They have the
full authority to hear federal claims, and sometimes are the only courts that
have such authority, when federal jurisdiction is lacking. In addition, under
the Madisonian compromise, state courts would have been the only lower
federal courts if Congress had chosen not to establish an independent federal judiciary.83 It is therefore extremely hard to identify characteristics of
less than constitutional or statutory magnitude that would destroy a federal
court's "federal" character if imported from state court in diversity cases.
To put the question concretely, why are non-constitutional, non-statutory
judge-jury rules any more "essential" than the countless other procedural
rules that federal courts must borrow from state courts under Hanna? Federal courts must follow the Seventh Amendment, but beyond that, how does
borrowing judge-jury rules from state courts to avoid a twin-aims violation
offend the "essential character" of a federal court?
Because of the inherent plasticity of essentialism as a limiting principle on Byrd balancing, there is the constant risk that the invocation of Byrd
is just a screen for disregarding twin aims in important areas of diversity
practice. This implicates the theoretical concern once more: it is possible
that federal procedural common law is being used haphazardly, under Byrd,
to trump Congress's will as expressed in the RDA (interpreted by Hanna).
These thorny theoretical and practical difficulties provide good reasons to
prefer the equally plausible "Byrd as a subset of Hanna" reading developed
above.
Finally, even if Byrd does provide a separate test, and even if a freefloating federal interest may sometimes be sufficient to trump a twin-aims
violation, how should the Byrd test be applied? The opinion itself does not
specify how the balancing test should be conducted (another strike against
reading Byrd as embodying a dramatically different test than Hanna). But
the opinion can be read to indicate that the federal interest should be
weighed against the state interest, as well as the potential for outcome disparity.
Notably, the test does not ensure that the federal rule will win. In Byrd
itself, the federal rule carried the day because the state interest was minimal
(simply an accident of the state's worker's compensation scheme), and the
possibility of outcome disparity was low, while the federal interest was an

83.
See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 8 (5th ed. 2003).
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important one. 84 Even within Byrd's (possible) sphere, if the state interest is
more intense than it was in Byrd, or when outcome disparity is more likely
to be a problem, then by Byrd's own terms the balance could favor the state
rule. We thus come to the second major exception to the supposed federal
hegemony in the judge-jury area: even if Byrd provides an alternative RDA
test, then a state judge-jury rule might still prevail over a federal rule if the
state interest is sufficiently intense, or the possibility of outcome disparity is
sufficiently high.85
No doubt in part because of the theoretical and practical complexities,
Byrd's ambit in the years since Hanna has been fairly limited. Byrd was not
discussed in a Supreme Court case for almost forty years, until 1996 in
Gasperini.86 Hanna's twin-aims test clearly became the prevailing one at
the Supreme Court and in the lower courts. This in itself casts doubt on the
"Byrd as a separate test" interpretation. For despite the fact that many of the
federal rules in these cases implicated important federal interests, the cases
never suggested
that those interests could outweigh a potential twin-aims
87
violation.
Byrd has, however, enjoyed a great deal of influence in the lower
88
courts in the area of judge-jury rules-the immediate topic of Byrd itself.
In fact, many federal courts have taken a position more extreme than Byrd
itself, by holding not only that judge-jury rules necessarily trigger use of an
alternative Byrd test, but also that the federal rule necessarily wins in the
weighing supposedly contemplated by Byrd.
The exemplar here is the Fifth Circuit's decision in Boeing Co. v.
Shipman, which involved the question of whether federal courts in diversity
cases should follow a state sufficiency standard that was more juryfavorable than the federal "reasonable jury" standard. 89 The Fifth Circuit
84.
See Byrd, 356 U.S. 525. One might argue that the Court should have been more
sensitive to potential state interests supporting the allocation to the judge. But for our purposes, all that matters is that the Court thought the state had no important interest.
85.
Some have questioned whether the three-legged balancing test from Byrd even
makes sense; however, I do not agree with this criticism. Like any balancing test, this interpretation of Byrd simply calls for a nuanced, context-sensitive judgment in the individual
case. My dispute is not with balancing tests, but with the use of a separate Byrd test in willful derogation of Hanna's twin-aims test.
86.
Byrd was cited in passing by the Court in Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429
U.S. 648, 649-50 (1977) (per curiam). See generally Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc.,
518 U.S. 415 (1996).
87.
See Freer, supra note 31, at 1652.

88.
See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else
Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?,

73 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 963, 1007-08 (1998) (noting that if Byrd is invoked anywhere, it
will be "in the Seventh Amendment-shadowed area of allocation of decisionmaking [sic]
authority among federal juries, trial judges, and appellate courts").
89.
Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1969).
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did not ask whether the stricter federal standard would produce a twin-aims
violation. 9° It did not even find that the Byrd test applied and then conduct a
nuanced weighing of the state and federal interests. 9 1 Instead, it rejected the
state rule solely because it involved the judge-jury relationship:
Federal courts must be able to control the fact-finding
processes by which the rights of litigants are determined in
order to preserve "the essential character" of the federal judicial system. Of course, we do not contend that this control will not affect state-created substantive rights in some
cases. Ultimately, however, the integrity of our factfinding
92
processes must outweigh considerations of uniformity.
This was a thin Erie analysis indeed. Inexplicably, though the court relied on Byrd, it did not even engage in Byrd balancing, but instead used the
vague "integrity of our factfinding processes" as an Erie trump card. 93 If the
court had balanced, the state rule certainly should have won out. Unlike the
rule in Byrd, which gave a jury issue to the judge, the more jury-favorable
sufficiency standard in Boeing was consistent with the federal policy in
favor of "assign[ing] the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the
jury." 94 The state pro-jury policy and the federal pro-jury policy should
have pointed the same way and have even been reinforced by any outcome
disparity that divergence might have produced.
Boeing was therefore an extreme decision. It essentially eschewed all
Erie analysis, including Byrd balancing, simply because the rule involved
the judge-jury relationship. Boeing is, unfortunately, characteristic of many
lower court decisions in this area. These decisions erect a federal enclave
around the judge-jury relationship, immune from all influence that state law
might have under normal Erie principles. I will refer to the theory espoused
by Boeing and similar cases as the "enclave theory" of judge-jury relations
throughout the remainder of this article.9 5
We have already seen in this section that the enclave theory cannot be
correct, for three separate reasons: first, when a state judge-jury rule is
bound up with state substantive rights, then even Byrd recognizes that
Erie's constitutional holding requires a federal court to use the state rule;
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Id at 370.
94.
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
I am indebted to Martin H. Redish and Carter G. Phillips for the term, "en95.
clave," to describe this approach to judge-jury rules in diversity cases. See Martin H. Redish
& Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the AppropriateDilemma, 91 HARv. L. REv. 356, 372 n.68 (1977).
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second, there are substantial theoretical reasons to doubt that Byrd presents
an alternative to the Hanna twin-aims test, even in the area of judge-jury
relations; finally, even if Byrd does create a separate test for some judgejury problems, it does not necessarily indicate use of the federal rule. If the
state interests are sufficiently strong, the possibility of outcome disparity is
sufficiently likely, or the state rule serves the important federal policy, then
even a Byrd balancing test could point toward the state rule.
C.

GASPERINI

Any theory of the influence Byrd may or may not have in the judgejury area must now take into account the Court's decision in Gasperini v.
Centerfor Humanities, Inc.96 The case resulted from a tort reform effort in
New York, in which the State had adopted a more liberal standard for new
trial on the basis of excessive compensatory damages. The new standard
required state trial and appellate courts to order a new trial if they determined that an award "deviates materially from what would be reasonable
compensation." 97 "Deviates materially" was easier for a defendant to
meet-and more threatening to the jury's verdict-than the federal "shocks
the conscience" standard, and was meant to produce a tighter range of compensatory damages awards in New York. 98 The Second Circuit, in Gasperini, applied the state standard instead of the federal standard and ordered a
new trial. 99
In the first part of its decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the
Second Circuit that New York's "deviates materially" standard did provide
the proper standard for new trial in federal diversity cases. 00 But the Court
then held that the state practice of allowing appellate judges to apply the
0
standard and grant new trials under it did not control in federal court.' '
Federal district judges, not federal appellate judges, should apply that standard, and federal appellate judges must restrict
themselves to reviewing
102
discretion.
of
abuse
for
decisions
court
district
The reasoning behind these separate holdings (which I will refer to as
"Gasperini (I)" and "Gasperini (II)") potentially illustrates a great deal
about the effect of state law on judge-jury rules in diversity cases. In Gasperini (I), the Court first determined that Federal Rule 59-which simply
96.
97.
98.
1995).
99.
100.
101.
102.

518 U.S. 415 (1996).
Id. at 418 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney 1995)).
See Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003, 1012 (2d Cir.
See Gasperini,518 U.S. at 439.
Id. at 429-30.
Id.
Id. at 437.
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allows for new trial "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States"does not itself provide a standard for new trial.10 3 This meant the "shocks
the conscience" standard is a rule of federal procedural common law, and
shifts the Erie analysis into the RDA zone. The Court then applied Hanna,
not Byrd, to determine that state-federal divergence would violate twin
aims: "We ...agree with the Second Circuit that New York's check on

excessive damages implicates what we have called Erie's 'twin aims.' ...
Erie precludes a recovery in federal court significantly
1 4 larger than the recovery that would have been tolerated in state court."
The result of the Hanna analysis is not surprising: the availability of
relatively unconstrained compensatory damages in federal court could be a
significant inducement to forum-shopping and would cause the kind of inequity contemplated by Erie. The holding is instead significant because the
Court followed the state judge-jury rule, and in doing so, did not cite Byrd.
In fact, not only did the Court rely exclusively on Hanna, but it also did not
history of the RDA
even mention Byrd in its obligatory recitation of0the
5
Hanna.1
to
York
from
directly
skipping
test, instead
Gasperini (I) is a powerful sign that Byrd-if construed as a test distinct from Hanna twin aims-does not even extend to all judge-jury rules in
the RDA zone. The rule at issue in Gasperinivitally affected the judge-jury
relationship by making it easier for a judge to grant a new trial and, thus,
making it less likely that a jury verdict would stand.10 6 Moreover, like the
state rule in Byrd, the New York rule transferred power from the jury to the
judge, in apparent derogation of the strong federal policy in favor of jury
decisions. Yet this portion of the opinion did not even cite Byrd, and exclusively relied on the Hanna twin-aims test instead. 107
Thus, Gasperinidefinitively disproved the "enclave theory" of judgejury rules once and for all, because it showed that state law can have an
influence on judge-jury rules in federal court. Moreover, Gasperiniundermined the theory that Byrd provides an independent test distinct from
Hanna twin aims. Here was the first Erie case at the Supreme Court in forty
years involving a judge-jury rule-the purported wheelhouse of the separate Byrd test-yet the reasoning did not even mention Byrd. If this kind of
rule does not trigger a separate Byrd test, then what could? 0 8
Id. at 433 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a)).
103.
104.
Gasperini,at 430-3 1.
See id. at 428.
105.
See id. at 438-39.
106.
See id.at 427-31.
107.
108.
See Freer, supra note 31, at 164 ("It is difficult to imagine an issue better calculated to incline the Court to address Byrd.").
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A few pages later, however, the Court introduced a wrinkle. Gasperini
(II) contained the first substantive discussion of Byrd in a Supreme Court
opinion in decades.' 9 In this part of the opinion, the Court found that although New York allowed both trial and appellate judges to apply "deviates
materially," federal appellate courts should not apply it, and instead should
only review district judges' decisions under the standard for abuse of discretion. 10 The Court reasoned that "[w]ithin the federal system, practical
reasons combine with Seventh Amendment constraints to lodge in the district court, not the court of appeals, primary responsibility for application of
§ 5501(c)'s 'deviates materially' check.""' The practical reason was the
federal trial judge's "unique opportunity to consider the evidence in the
living courtroom context."' 2 The Seventh Amendment constraint was the
Reexamination Clause, which prohibits federal appellate courts from reexamining any fact found by a jury. Yet, as in Byrd, the Court declined to rely
expressly on the Seventh Amendment and stopped short of holding that the
Amendment prohibits a federal appellate court from applying "deviates
materially." 13
The analysis in this portion of the opinion was not pellucid, but the
Court appears to have recognized a new "essential characteristic"-the relationship between federal trial and appellate courts."14 The Court cited Byrd,
though it did not really conduct any Byrd balancing, and thus revealed little
about how that balancing should operate in practice. One might argue,
however, that Gasperini (II) preserves some hope that Byrd still contains a
separate test for RDA questions.
But then how does one reconcile the two holdings in Gasperini? On
the one hand, Gasperini(I) involved a judge-jury rule, but did not even cite
Byrd, much less its language about the judge-jury relationship being an
"essential characteristic" of the federal system. It instead relied on the standard Hanna test, indicating both that state law has a role in the judge-jury
area and that some judge-jury rules are immune from Byrd balancing. Then,
in Gasperini (II), the Court seemed to do an about face, identifying a new
essential characteristic-the trial-appellate relationship--and citing Byrd to
hold that state practice was not controlling." 5 Gasperiniseemed to demonstrate a simultaneous contraction and expansion of what Byrd had commonly been thought to mean.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See Gasperini,518 U.S. at 431-38.
Id. at 437-38.
Id. at 38.
Id.
See id.
Gasperini,518 U.S. at 438.
Id.
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One route to harmony is to say that Gasperini simply confirmed that
the Byrd analysis is a mere subset of Hanna twin-aims analysis. On this
reading, part one did not need to cite Byrd because Hanna is an identical
test, so citation of one is equivalent to citation of the other. In a similar
vein, part two's citation of Byrd was equally insignificant: it merely repeated the writ small "twin-aims" analysis found in Byrd. No one could
seriously contend that the application of "deviates materially" by federal
trial courts, rather than appellate courts, has any real impact on forum selection or promises any substantial inequity between state and federal litigants:
the standard is what matters, not whether litigants get two bites at the apple
or just one. Arguably, then, the reasoning about "essential characteristic" in
the second part of Gasperiniserved the same function it did in Byrd, if Byrd
is read as a subset of Hanna: it simply acknowledged that where twin aims
are not implicated, important federal interests should be respected. Supporting this "Byrd as a subset of Hanna" reading, the Court found that not applying "deviates materially," at all, would introduce "substantial" variations
between state and federal money judgments, implicating twin aims. 16 But it
noted no such concern with respect to the trial-appellate allocation of authority: to the contrary, it said that "New York's dominant interest can be
respected, without disrupting the federal system, once it is recognized that
17
the federal district court is capable of performing the checking function.""1
If Byrd is instead conceived as an alternative RDA test, then it is more
difficult to explain the Court's use of the test in part two, but not in part
one. Essentialism is difficult enough already. But Gasperini (I) indicates
that not even "the judge-jury relationship" is sufficient to capture an "essen8 And if judge-jury rules are not a
tial characteristic" of the federal system! 11
limiting principle, then what is?
Though Gasperinidoes not say so explicitly (it says few things explicitly), it may be capable of supporting a practically and theoretically workable limiting principle for a distinct Byrd test: constitutional avoidance.
Simply put, the RDA is a statute, and under standard principles of statutory
interpretation, the Court may interpret a statute so as to avoid substantial
constitutional questions. 19 A distinct Byrd test may simply be an alternative interpretation of the RDA, employed when a state rule would raise substantial constitutional issues if applied in federal court. It would allow a
Id. at 430.
116.
Id.at 437.
117.
See Gasperini, 518 U.S. 415.
118.
See INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) ("[I]f an otherwise acceptable
119.
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is 'fairly possible,' we are obligated to construe the statute to
avoid such problems." (citation omitted)).
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federal court to balance away a twin-aims violation when the state rule
raises serious constitutional issues.
This constitutional avoidance interpretation seems to explain the existing cases, and also provides a workable test for "essential characteristics"
that may trigger a distinct Byrd test for RDA problems. First, it explains the
analyses in both Byrd and Gasperini.In Byrd, by balancing, the Court was
able to avoid a substantial trial by jury issue: whether the Seventh Amendment provides a right to jury trial for the "statutory employer" issue. Likewise, in Gasperini (II), by applying the Byrd test, the Court was able to
avoid a difficult Reexamination Clause issue: whether a federal appellate
court may apply a "deviates materially" standard in reviewing a trial court's
0
denial of a new trial motion.12
By contrast, in Gasperini (I), the application of "deviates materially"
by a federal district judge presented no substantial constitutional question.
As the Court observed in that very opinion, "[T]he Reexamination Clause
does not inhibit the authority of trial judges to grant new trials 'for any of
the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at
law in the courts of the United States.' That authority is large."' 12' Thus the
issue in Gasperini(I) did not raise a difficult Seventh Amendment question,
and the Court did not need to avoid such a question by applying a less stateprotective Byrd balancing test. 122
The constitutional avoidance interpretation of Byrd not only explains
the extant cases, but it also avoids all the theoretical and practical difficulties explicated in the previous section. The theoretical difficulty was justifying how an "essential characteristic" could trump a twin-aims violation,
when Congress (as interpreted by Hanna) has mandated use of the state rule
in situations that implicate twin aims. Constitutional avoidance solves this
difficulty. When a federal court applies Byrd, it is not privileging a federal
interest over a federal statute. Instead, it is interpretinga federal statute, in a
way that avoids constitutional difficulties. 123 Byrd and Hanna are not dueling interpretations of the same statute; they are interlocking interpretations.
Byrd applies where a constitutional issue is present, and Hanna applies in
all other cases. This interpretation is also true to Erie, because it gives
maximum sway to the policy of avoiding litigant inequity, first noted in that
decision, compromising that policy only in the name of avoiding serious
constitutional issues in federal court.

See Gasperini,518 U.S. at 438.
121. Id. at 433.
122. Id.
at 433-40.
123. The RDA is certainly cryptic enough to suffer interpretation. See Ely, supra
note 6, at 710 (noting that the RDA is not self-defining).
120.
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Constitutional avoidance is also more workable than essentialism as a
trigger for the Byrd test. Essentialism is infinitely malleable, and threatens
to undermine, erratically, the legislative intent embodied in the RDA (as
interpreted by Hanna). Constitutional avoidance is a much more concrete
trigger because the court need only decide whether the state rule raises a
substantial constitutional issue. This interpretation of Byrd mitigates the
potential encroachment on twin aims in the name of protean federal interests and is therefore a desirabletrigger for an alternative test.
Finally, constitutional avoidance explains why "balancing" has been
confined to two Supreme Court cases and has not been extended to other
cases that arguably involved important federal interests. Both Byrd and
Gasperini contained potential Seventh Amendment issues, and the other
cases did not. The approach even explains why Byrd and Gasperini curiously failed to address the Seventh Amendment issues head on, despite
identifying them. Both decisions were actively trying to avoid addressing
the possibly thorny constitutional problems.
Quite frankly, this is the only reading that makes sense of Gasperini
(I). It was hard enough to define the Byrd trigger before Gasperini, but
most thought it at least included judge-jury rules. Gasperini proved that
theory wrong, and showed that the trigger must be even narrower than that.
The only principled basis for a narrower trigger is the need to avoid a constitutional question. Helpfully, that trigger was confirmed pages later in
Gasperini (II), where the Court seemed to apply Byrd to avoid a difficult
constitutional question.
For all of these reasons, if Byrd is characterized as a different test from
Hanna's twin aims, it should be strictly limited to state rules that raise substantial constitutional questions. This reading explains the existing cases,
puts the Byrd test on a solid theoretical footing, and provides a trigger that
is far more workable than essentialism. The Supreme Court's cases do not
adopt this interpretation explicitly.' 24 But they do not say much of anything
explicitly. And the Seventh Amendment-suffused language of Byrd and
Gasperinistrongly suggests that constitutional avoidance is what the Court
was really up to. 25 Lower courts could do much worse than this, if they
must treat Byrd as a distinct test for RDA questions.
D.

ERIE FRAMEWORK FOR JUDGE-JURY QUESTIONS

In short, this part has provided several substantial reasons to doubt that
federal law should dominate the judge-jury relationship in federal diversity
124.

See Gasperini,518 U.S. 415; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356

125.

See Gasperini, 518 U.S. 415; Byrd, 356 U.S. 525.

U.S. 525 (1958).
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cases. Federal law, of course, has a role here. If the Seventh Amendment or
a federal statute requires a certain federal rule, it obviously controls. A valid
Federal Rule should also prevail under Hanna'sREA holding.
But if the state judge-jury rule is bound up with state substance, then
Erie's constitutional holding requires a federal court to follow it. And
where no federal rule controls; a state judge-jury rule that implicates Erie's
twin aims normally should trump the federal rule, even when not bound up
with state substance. The Byrd test, on the other hand, is either identical to
the Hanna test, or should be limited to state judge-jury rules that raise constitutional issues in federal court.
Furthermore, even when constitutional avoidance warrants invocation
of Byrd, sometimes Byrd balancing will favor the federal rule. In that event,
the court must confront the constitutional issue, and if the Constitution does
not prohibit the state rule, the state rule should control. There should certainly be no hegemony of federal law in the judge-jury arena. State law may
constitutional holding, Hanna's twin-aims test, or
come in under Erie's
126
Byrd's balancing test.
In the next two parts, I apply this framework to two of the most basic
and important judge-jury problems: the sufficiency of the evidence and the
allocation of questions to judge or jury. In these concrete contexts, the importance of following state law-and the inequity of a federal enclavebecome apparent. These parts also show that, despite substantial adherence
to the enclave theory, many federal courts do follow state law. This indicates that my prescriptions are both workable and contain some truth.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In this Part, I apply the Erie framework, developed above, to the extremely important issue of sufficiency of the evidence. When an issue is
committed to the jury, "sufficiency" marks the boundary between the jury's
authority and the judge's authority. If the evidence is "insufficient" under
the appropriate standard, then the judge is authorized to resolve against the
party on that issue. If the evidence is "sufficient," then the judge must send
27
the issue to the jury and allow the jury's decision to stand after verdict.'
126. Even if one rejects my reading of what Gasperinisays about Byrd, one cannot
deny that state law must have some influence on judge-jury rules. Substantive judge-jury
rules, or those "bound up" with substance, must control in federal court. And, at least sometimes, Byrd balancing should not favor the federal rule (if it deserves to be called a balancing
test at all, and not a federal trump card).
127.
Though I often use the term "directed verdict," the analysis applies equally well
to motions for JNOV and summary judgment. As the Supreme Court has held, the primary
difference between summary judgment and directed verdict "is procedural; summary judgment motions are usually made before trial and decided on documentary evidence, while
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Sufficiency issues arise with respect to both pure factual issues (such
as causation and intent) and so-called "mixed questions of law and fact."
Mixed questions require the application of the law to the facts found by the
jury; the application of the negligence standard of care to the facts of a case
is the classic example. Sometimes, the mixed question is allocated to the
judge, in which case the judge simply decides it and no sufficiency issue is
presented. But when the mixed question is allocated to the jury, sufficiency
comes into play because the judge must decide whether the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to find that the law applies to the provable facts. I
refer to this as "mixed question sufficiency," in contrast to "historical fact
sufficiency."
As it turns out, the Erie analysis is somewhat different for mixed question sufficiency and historical fact sufficiency. In the first section, I show
that the RDA framework, indicated by Gasperini,generally requires adherence to state court historical fact sufficiency opinions.1 28 Then in the second
section, I show that mixed question sufficiency decisions are substantive
and, therefore, binding as a matter of constitutional law. In both areas,
many federal appellate cases apply state law and therefore vindicate my
approach.
A.

HISTORICAL FACT SUFFICIENCY

In a historical fact sufficiency decision, the judge must decide whether
the jury should be allowed to infer a material historical fact from certain
pieces of evidence presented at trial. For example, a judge may have to decide whether the plaintiffs evidence of causation is sufficient to allow a
jury to infer that the defendant caused the plaintiffs injury.
A controversy raged for almost sixty years over whether state or federal abstract sufficiency standards should govern in diversity cases. The
federal courts have always used a reasonable jury standard: the judge may
take the issue from the jury only if reasonable jurors could not infer the
existence of a fact from the evidence presented at trial. Several states, however, had materially different standards. Some states sent an issue to the
jury if there was merely a scintilla of evidence to support the party trying to

directed verdict motions are made at trial and decided on the evidence that has been admitted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986) (quoting Bill Johnson's
Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.1 1(1983)). "In essence, though, the inquiry under
each is the same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id.
at 251-52.
128. See infraPart II.A.
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prove the fact; the so-called "scintilla standards." 129 Other states have had
"no evidence" standards for certain issues, requiring the issue to go to the
jury regardless of how little evidence the proponent proffers. 3 ° Still other
states phrase their standards in ways that arguably differed from the federal
reasonable jury standard.'3 1
The Supreme Court never resolved whether the state or federal standard applies, and a circuit split soon developed.1 32 Today, the clear weight
of authority lies on the side of the federal standard.133 Only the Sixth Circuit
and D.C. Circuit clearly opt to apply the state standard (in the case of the
D.C. Circuit, the district standard). 34 In three circuits, the answer is still
129.
Alabama is one state that preserves a scintilla standard. See Battles v. San Ann
Serv., Inc., 441 So. 2d 925, 927 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983).
130.
Arizona, for example, had a constitutional provision requiring a contributory
negligence issue to always go to the jury. See Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 92 (1931);
see also Steven Alan Childress, JudicialReview and DiversityJurisdiction:Solving an Irrepressible Erie Mystery?, 47 SMU L. REv. 271, 293 (1994) (listing states that sometimes
apply a "no evidence" standard).
131.
The standard in Indiana, for example, allows the court to direct a verdict only if
the evidence "points unerringly" one way. See Mayer v. Gary Partners & Co., 29 F.3d 330,
333 (7th Cir. 1994).
132.
See Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 445 (1959) (noting the circuit split
but finding that "the question is not properly here for decision"). Dick was the Supreme
Court's last word on the subject. The Supreme Court may never have stepped in to resolve
the circuit split because it did not consider it to be an important one. Some evidence of that
view appears in the case upholding general directed verdict practice, where the Court
seemed to indicate that the choice of an abstract standard is not likely to be meaningful
unless the state really does have a rare scintilla or no-evidence standard:
It hardly affords help to insist upon "substantial evidence" rather than
"some evidence" or "any evidence," or vice versa. The matter is essentially one to be worked out in particular situations and for particular
types of cases. Whatever may be the general formulation, the essential
requirement is that mere speculation be not allowed to do duty for probative facts, after making due allowance for all reasonably possible inferences favoring the party whose case is attacked.
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 395 (1943).
Because the vast majority of states follow a reasonable jury standard or one very
similar to it, the Court may have been content to leave the issue to the few circuits where a
state scintilla or no-evidence standard does present an issue. The Court's language in Galloway recognizes, however, the crucial importance of state court decisions on particularsufficiency issues: the question that occupies the bulk of this Part.
133.
See Haberman v. Hartford Ins. Group, 443 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006);
Hamburger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 875, 883 (5th Cir. 2004); Gallagher
v. Wilton Enters., Inc., 962 F.2d 120, 124-25 (1st Cir. 1992); Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956
F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992); Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 99 (4th Cir.
1991); Jones v. Miles Labs, Inc., 887 F.2d 1576, 1578 (11th Cir. 1989); Sankovich v. Life
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 638 F.2d 136, 138 n.l (9th Cir. 1981).
134.
See Kusens v. Pascal Co., 448 F.3d 349, 360 (6th Cir. 2006); Raynor v. Merrell
Pharm. Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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muddled or undecided-likely because the similarity between the135state and
federal standards does not require those circuits to make a choice.
It seems fairly clear that the abstract standard issue, which so perplexed the federal courts, is now an REA question and a relatively easy one
at that. In 1991, Federal Rule 50 was amended to provide that the court may
resolve a jury issue against a party (either by directing a verdict or granting
JNOV) only if "the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.", 36 This
amendment, adopted with full knowledge of the then-fifty-year-old debate,
must be considered to have elevated the reasonable-jury standard from federal rule to Federal Rule.
Under Hanna's REA test, this Rule controls unless it purports to address matters that are not "rationally classifiable" as procedural. 3 7 And the
abstract standard is readily classifiable as procedural because the choice
between "reasonable jury," "scintilla," and "no evidence" standards arguably represents a procedural decision about the relative capacity of judges
and juries to infer the correct historical facts from the evidence presented at
trial.
That a historical fact is a "jury issue" at all indicates a belief that the
jury is more accurate than the judge at inferring the truth across some range
of evidence. One might hold this belief for a variety of reasons: jurors'
greater fund of real world experience, the fresh eyes they bring to a case, or
the virtues of group deliberation and decision-making. On the other hand,
the fact that directed verdict and JNOV are also available shows that we do
not have complete confidence in the jury's fact-finding ability; otherwise,
we would trust the jury to find the correct facts even when the evidence is
slim.
The potential problems with jury fact-finding are equally well-known:
jurors may be too ready to credit certain kinds of evidence, they may bring
biases into the jury room, and group decision-making may introduce cognitive biases. Jurors' lack of experience with the realities of litigation and the
limitations of evidence may cause them to over- or under-estimate the
probabilities indicated by various pieces of evidence. Jurors may be too
unwilling to credit circumstantial evidence, or may demand unrealistic
quantities of evidence to support a fact (the "CSI effect").
135.
Compare To-Am Equip. Co. v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift Am., Inc., 152
F.3d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 1998) (federal), and Finley v. River N. Records, Inc., 148 F.3d 913,
918 (8th Cir. 1998) (federal), with Winger v. Winger, 82 F.3d 140, 143 (7th Cir. 1996)
(state), and Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 540 (8th Cir. 1990) (state). See also Willis v.
Westin Hotel Co., 884 F.2d 1556, 1563 n.5 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting the question remains
undecided). For a more detailed review of the circuit split, see Childress, supra note 130.
136.
FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).
137.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY L,4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 30

This risk of error is the cost of jury fact finding. That cost is incurred
both by the litigant deprived of the proper verdict and by the system as a
whole, which loses legitimacy when it produces an incorrect result. The
legitimacy cost is likely to increase when the evidence is weaker, because
the injustice is more blatant and observable when the jury renders a verdict
against the great weight of the evidence.
The different sufficiency standards can be regarded as embodying different views of the relative costs and benefits of jury fact-finding. A "no
evidence" jurisdiction trusts the jury almost completely, and concludes that
costs almost never exceed the benefits. These states determine that withdrawal of the issue from the jury is warranted only when there is literally
"no" evidence. A "scintilla" jurisdiction concludes that the costs exceed the
benefits in only the most extreme cases. A "reasonable jury" jurisdiction
concludes that there is an even greater range of cases where the costs of
jury decision are too high. 38 The choice of sufficiency standard therefore
has a rational procedural basis, grounded in the jurisdiction's attitude toward the fact-finding capacities of juries. Under Hanna's REA test, that is
sufficient to require use of the federal standard.1 39 A federal court need not
send a historical fact issue to the jury when it is supported by only a scintilla of evidence, or no evidence-regardless of contrary state practice.140
The amendment to Rule 50 did not, however, settle what is arguably a
much more interesting question regarding historical fact sufficiency: the
bindingness of state court decisions applying a reasonable jury standard (or
a similar abstract standard). Of course, most constellations of evidence at
trial are unique, meaning that many state court historical fact sufficiency
decisions are sui generis and never could have precedential value in a future
federal case. But evidentiary problems do recur, which means that some
historical fact sufficiency opinions will have precedential value. For example, in toxic tort litigation, a particular epidemiological report may conclude
that a drug caused a birth defect. A state court may hold that a reasonable
138.
Directed verdict on historical facts may also be justified as a way to save time
and costs, but this rationale is not completely persuasive. A directed verdict occurs after
much or all of the evidence is in. JNOV occurs after both trial and verdict. Moreover, most
of the cost in terms of time and resources occurs before trial, so a savings of the time it
would take for the jury to render a verdict-perhaps a week at most-is not particularly
significant in the scheme of things.
139. The "substantive rights" limitation of the REA might in some circumstances
still indicate use of the state rule, for example, where the state has adopted a "no evidence"
or "scintilla" standard for a particular cause of action for the purpose of favoring a particular
class of litigant. This consideration is not present, however, where the state has simply
adopted a standard applicable to all cases across the board, as most states have.
140.
For another commentator who agrees that the amendment to Rule 50 mooted the
abstract standard issue (though for somewhat different reasons), see Childress, supra note
130, at 312.
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jury could conclude, on the basis of the report, that the drug caused the
plaintiffs birth defect. In a future case involving the same drug, the same
sufficiency issue might arise. Similarly, in asbestos cases, certain problems
of proving exposure to the defendant's product may recur in state and federal court. In either of these situations, should a federal court be bound to
conclude that similar evidence is sufficient (or insufficient) to create a jury
issue?
This is an RDA question because Rule 50 does not purport to dictate
how the "reasonable jury" standard applies to particular congeries of
facts. 14 1 And if the Hanna test applies, it seems clear that state court decisions should be binding in federal court. By hypothesis, the state court has
come out one way or the other on a historical fact sufficiency issue that has
recurring importance. The state has either chosen to allow the issue to go to
the jury on certain evidence, or not. Either way, if the federal court does not
follow the state decision, it will become, from the outset of the lawsuit, a
more or less attractive forum for one of the parties, in the most important
way possible: whether the case is winnable or doomed to failure. 142 Such a
crucial difference will undoubtedly cause forum-shopping. And it would be
inequitable in all the ways that matter under Erie: in one forum
the case will
143
have a chance of going forward, and in the other, it will not.
Is it possible to justify ignoring the state decisions and generating a
twin-aims violation? As shown in the previous Part, Byrd is either a subset
141.
As the Court's reasoning in Galloway illustrated, the abstract standard is separable from applications of that standard. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 395
(1943).
142.
See Michael H. Gottesman, Should Federal Evidence Rules Trump State Tort
Policy? The Federalism Values Daubert Ignored, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1837, 1841 (1994)
(arguing that when federal courts ignore state rulings on sufficiency of the evidence going to
historical facts, they introduce substantial and inequitable disparity between state and federal
court outcomes).
143.
Reinforcing my point, Chief Justice Warren's law clerk at the time he wrote
Hanna-John Hart Ely-agreed in an article written before 1991 that the twin-aims test
would mandate application of the state-sufficiency standard. See Ely, supra note 6, at 71416. Ely wrote:
Thus, state rules controlling such things as burden of proof, presumptions, and sufficiency of evidence should be followed where they differ
from the federal court's usual practice; but those regulating such matters
as the form of pleadings, order of proof, time limits on responsive pleadings, and the method by which an adversary is given notice can ordinarily be disregarded, though of course there is no reason they must.
Id. (emphasis added).
Ely would certainly agree that failing to follow state court decisions with precedential value would disserve the twin aims. A recent commentator's assertion that standards
for directed verdict do not affect forum decisions seems counterintuitive. See Childress,
supra note 130, at 317. Indeed, the ease of getting to a jury is perhaps the key strategic decision in choosing a forum.
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of Hanna, or if it provides a distinct balancing test, should apply only
where the state rule would raise a substantial constitutional question. State
sufficiency opinions raise no such constitutional difficulty. The constitutionality of directed verdict practice (and sufficiency review in general) has
been plain ever since the Court upheld the reasonable jury standard in 1943,
in Galloway v. United States.144 If the reasonable jury standard did not violate the Seventh Amendment, then good faith applications of that standard
cannot possibly violate the Amendment either.
At the most basic level, why should the federal courts have an interest
in fostering forum-shopping and inequity by ignoring state court decisions
on recurring issues of evidentiary sufficiency? It does not offend the dignity
of a federal court to borrow state rules in this area; Hanna routinely requires such borrowing when procedural rules in any other area implicate
twin aims. At root, Hanna teaches that a federal court sitting in diversity is
supposed to emulate a state court in all the ways that really matter (and
where the Constitution, statute, or Federal Rule does not require otherwise).
Sufficiency decisions, affecting the very viability of the case, are surely
rules that matter in that sense.
Nor does following these rules somehow impair the "essential function" of a federal court. It offends no constitutional principle. And a state
court is not any less of a court-or even any less of a "federal" courtbecause it diverges from a federal court's own opinion on the application of
the reasonable jury standard. The Boeing court was simply in denial about
the significance of Hanna in asserting that "[f]ederal courts must be able to
control the fact-finding processes by which the rights of litigants are determined in order to preserve 'the essential character' of the federal judicial
system."' 145 The court essentially refuted its own position when in the next
breath it admitted that
its holding would "affect state-created substantive
1 46
rights in some cases."
In fact, federal appellate cases, for more than forty years, have accorded binding force to state historical fact sufficiency decisions. A brief
review of some of these cases shows that courts intuitively recognize the
validity of this position. In one case, the plaintiff's decedent had been found
144.
145.

319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943).
Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1969).
Query what the answer to the "abstract standard" question should have been if
Rule 50 had not been revised: Hanna, rather than Byrd, would apply to the RDA question,
because Galloway indicates that abstract standards do not normally implicate the Seventh
Amendment, especially when the state standard is a more jury-favorable, no-evidence or
scintilla standard. And because the availability of a scintilla or no-evidence standard could
affect forum choice or introduce inequity, the state-abstract standard arguably would have
controlled. See id.
146.
Id.
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fatally injured lying between the rails of a railroad track and could produce
no eyewitnesses. The court followed similar state cases holding that evidence as to his likely path, combined with a schedule showing that a train
was likely passing about that time, was sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that he was hit by the train.1 47 In another appellate case-a slip and
fall-the evidence showed that the plaintiff slipped on old, brown lettuce.
The court relied on numerous state cases to hold that the appearance of the
lettuce was sufficient to allow a jury to infer that the lettuce had been on the
floor a long time
(during which time it should have been noticed by store
48
employees). 1
A recent D.C. Circuit case involved a plaintiff alleging that the drug
Bendectin had caused certain birth defects. 49 A previous district case (i.e.,
the equivalent of a state court case) had held that certain scientific evidence
was sufficient to show that Bendectin could cause the defects plaintiff alleged. 150 The D.C. Circuit stated that it would normally consider such a case
to be binding. 151 It declined to follow the district case only because new
evidence tended to show that the causal link was more tenuous than previously believed; a perfectly legitimate
reason under standard Erie principles
152
to distinguish the district case.
Perhaps the most interesting case is Rotondo v. Keene Corp. from the
Third Circuit.' 53 The cases cited in the previous two paragraphs came from
circuits in the minority that apply or applied state-sufficiency standards in
diversity cases as a matter of course, and one might attempt to distinguish
them on that basis. 54 But the Rotondo court applied the federal abstract
standard: "This court applies the federal standard for judging the sufficiency of the evidence in diversity actions." 155 The court nevertheless proceeded to conclude that Pennsylvania's criteria for sufficiency of causation
evidence in an asbestos case were binding on a federal court. The Third
Circuit read the Pennsylvania cases to require proof of proximity and prod147.
Gilreath v. S. Ry. Co., 323 F.2d 158, 163 (6th Cir. 1963).
148.
Rumsey v. Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co., 408 F.2d 89, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1969).
149.
Raynor v. Merrell Pharm. Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1372-73 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
150.
Id.at 1376.
151.
Id.
152.
Under Erie, federal courts are permitted to conclude that intervening events
would cause the highest court within the state (here, the district) to reach a different result.
See Intec USA, LLC v. Engle, 467 F.3d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Under Erie. . . the
federal court's task is not to made [sic] an independent decision but to predict how the Supreme Court of North Carolina would understand and apply its own law." (citation omitted)).
153.
956 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Third Circuit case is from 1969, when the Third Circuit also followed the
154.
state standard.
155.
Rotondo, 956 F.2d at 438.
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uct identity to send the exposure issue to the jury, and found that directed
verdict was improper because the plaintiff had shown both. 56 The court
went on to note that "[a]lthough it is true that there was no direct evidence
that Rotondo inhaled asbestos fibers shed by Ehret pipecovering, nothing in
the Pennsylvaniacases precludes the jury from making that inference from
testimony of the nature presented here."'1 57 This too indicated that the Third
Circuit considered the state-sufficiency opinions to be binding.
Anyone casually familiar with asbestos litigation knows that sufficiency of exposure evidence is the crucial issue in most cases. If the Third
Circuit had come out the other way, and applied either a looser or stronger
test for sufficiency, the consequences would have been dramatic. A stricter
standard would have caused defendants to flock to federal court, and vice
versa. To be sure, the disparate outcomes in litigated cases would have been
highly inequitable. As the Third Circuit intuitively recognized, neither Byrd
nor the bindingness of the abstract federal standard require such an unjust
result. Moreover, other cases that apply this sort of state opinion show that
58
my prescription is both practical and required by standard Erie principles.'
A highly suspect enclave theory should not countenance a blatant twin-aims
violation.
B.

MIXED QUESTION SUFFICIENCY

Mixed question sufficiency decisions, by contrast, illustrate the federal
constitutional dimension of state law's influence. Where a historical fact
sufficiency decision calls upon the judge to decide whether a reasonable
jury could infer certain historical facts from the evidence presented at trial,
mixed question sufficiency mode asks whether a reasonable jury could find
that the historical facts provable at trial measure up to the legal standard.
When the historical facts are undisputed, the mixed question is the only
issue; however, if it is allocated to the jury, the jury must decide unless the
issue is not open to reasonable dispute. 59 The mixed question is also pre156. Id.
157. Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
158.
For two other cases treating state sufficiency opinions as binding, see American
& Foreign Insurance Co. v. GeneralElectric Co., 45 F.3d 135, 139-40 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying Michigan cases on the sufficiency of causation evidence to determine that plaintiff
had only presented evidence establishing "speculation and conjecture"; therefore requiring
directed verdict), and Arms v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 731 F.2d 1245, 1249 (6th
Cir. 1984) (stating that Tennessee cases would be binding if they existed; instead, turning to
other state court cases).
159. Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111,
114 (1923) (recognizing that even when the jury is entrusted with law application, "it is
exercised by both court and jury, the court doing so under the guise of preventing the jury
from falling into manifest error"); see also James B. Thayer, "Law and Fact" in Jury Trials,
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sent in cases where the historical facts are disputed. There, the court must
also decide whether the facts that the proponent can possibly prove measure
up to the legal standard at issue in the case.
Negligence provides the classic example of a mixed question. The historical facts in a negligence case consist of the narrative of events and states
of mind that could fill a newspaper story about the events in question. In the
case of a pedestrian hit by a car, these questions might include:
[W]hether a pedestrian looked for traffic before stepping
off the curb, whether at this time defendant's automobile
was 50 feet or 200 feet away, whether the traffic signal was
red or green, the speed of the car, the distance in which it
could be stopped at that speed, whether the driver saw the
pedestrian, whether he sounded a horn, and so on .... '60
The mixed question, on the other hand, requires the jury to decide:
[W]hether the pedestrian should have looked or should
have seen the car, whether he should have proceeded with
the traffic light as it was, the reasonableness of the car's
speed, the adequacy of brakes which could perform as
these could, whether the driver should as a reasonable man
have foreseen that the pedestrian would
continue into dan61
ger, and should have blown his horn.'
As demonstrated by all the "shoulds," the mixed question demands a normative judgment. The decision maker must ascertain whether the conduct
in the case should be a ground for imposing liability.
As a matter of jurisprudential theory, the mixed question arises because the law contains standards, as well as rules. True rules do not really
give rise to a mixed question, because the broad rule of law depends only
upon the finding of a particular historical fact.162 A speed limit is the obvious example. The law penalizes a driver who exceeds fifty-five miles per
hour; all that matters is the historical fact, without the need for a mediating
4 HARV. L. REv. 147, 168 (1890) (characterizing the "question for the court" as "whether a
reasonable person could, upon the evidence, entertain the jury's opinion. Can the conduct
which the jury are judging, reasonably be thought reasonable?").
160.
Fleming James, Jr., Functionsof Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE
L.J. 667, 668 (1949).
161.
Id. at 668; see also Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110 (1995) (defining
facts as "a recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators").
162.
Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles,82 IOWA L. REv. 739,
740 (1997) ("Rules are legal norms that are formal and mechanical. They are triggered by a
few easily identified factual matters and are opaque in application to the values that they are
designed to serve.").
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mixed question. 163 The consequences of the conduct were all specified before it occurred.
Standards, unlike rules, do not specify the consequences of conduct
ahead of time. They instead set out a broad goal or purpose (for example,
"reasonable" or "justifiable" behavior), and require the decision maker to
determine, at the time of application, whether liability on particular facts
would further the goal. 164 By expressly postponing the moment of evaluation to the time when the standard is applied, standards allow circumstances
and the facts of the particular case to be taken into account. 65
Holmes famously argued that all mixed questions should go to the
judge by stating that "when standards of conduct are left to the jury, it is a
temporary surrender of a judicial function which may be resumed at any
moment in any case when the court feels competent to do so." 16 6 Holmes
based his argument on the normative nature of the mixed question, observing that:
163.
Legal rules that depend on a person's state of mind fall within this category. A
state of mind is a historical fact, though often a difficult one. For example, the law assigns
consequences to intent to discriminate on the basis of race. Once that intent is found, legal
consequences follow, without any mediating principle, so here too, the task of law application is mechanical. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 286 n.16 (1982) (holding
that intentional discrimination is both an "ultimate fact" and "a pure question of fact"); id.at
289 n. 19 ("We need not, therefore, address the much-mooted issue of the applicability of the
Rule 52(a) standard to mixed questions of law and fact .. ");United States v. McConney,
728 F.2d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[T]here are those mixed questions in which the applicable legal standard provides for a strictly factual test, such as state of mind, and the application of law to fact, consequently, involves an 'essentially factual' inquiry."); see also Bohlen, supra note 159, at 112 (noting that state of mind is a historical fact).
164.
To be sure, classifying a particular rule of law as a rule or a standard is not
always an easy task. For purposes of this article, I aim only to establish that there exist
mixed questions requiring the exercise of normative, evaluative judgment at the time of
application. Because I showed in Part II.A that historical fact sufficiency decisions should
control in federal court, courts should not, in practice, have to worry about distinguishing
historical fact sufficiency decisions from mixed question sufficiency decisions.
165.
See Roscoe Pound, The Theory ofJudicialDecision (111),
36 HARV. L. REV. 940,
951-52 (1923) ("Standards, applied intuitively by court or jury or administrative officer, are
devised for situations in which we are compelled to take circumstances into account; for
classes of cases in which each case is to a large degree unique.").
The debate regarding the relative utility of rules and standards is a perennial one
and need not detain us here. In brief, rules give clearer notice that certain conduct is illegal
and have lower costs of enforcement; however, they produce arbitrary results at the margins,
require higher up-front costs to determine the appropriate point of liability, and are problematic where uncertainty is a concern. Standards are costlier to apply and worse for prospective
advice, but they postpone the moment of evaluation and thus allow the decision maker to
incorporate facts as they develop, as well as provide nuanced justice in the individual case.
Here, I am only interested in showing that standards exist, giving rise to mixed questions
requiring normative judgment at the time of application.
166.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 126 (Dover Publ'ns 1991)
(1881).
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When a judge rules that there is no evidence of negligence,
he does something more than is embraced in an ordinary
ruling that there is no evidence of a fact. He rules that the
acts or omissions proved or in question do not constitute a
ground of legal liability, and in this way the law
67 is gradually enriching itself from daily life, as it should. 1
Holmes's preference for allocation to the judge did not carry the day.
Today, some mixed questions go to the judge and some to the jury. For
example, mixed questions in the area of contracts normally go to the judge,
while those in torts normally go to the jury. States ordinarily give precedential effect to mixed questions decided by judges, but not to mixed questions
decided by juries-no doubt in part because the jury does not explain the
reason for its decision. 68 Still, even when the mixed question goes to the
jury, the judge retains a vestigial evaluative role: she must decide whether a
reasonable jury could find that the facts provable by a party measure up to
the legal standard at issue. 169 In plain English, the judge may decide the
clear cases.70 These "clear case" decisions too customarily receive precedential force. 1
Mixed question or mixed question sufficiency decisions obviously
have less precedential value than decisions on pure questions of law. A
mixed question decision is more particularistic and will necessarily apply to
a smaller number of future cases. Yet, it can still exert a meaningful in167.
Id. at 120-21.
168.
See Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury
Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REv. 993, 1019 (1986); Stephen A.
Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1867, 1875
(1966) ("[T]he conclusion of the jury will have no precedential value extending beyond the
very case being adjudicated.").
One of the few judges to give precedential weight to a decision of a mixed question by a jury was, as one might predict, Holmes. See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 15 N.E.
491,494-95 (Mass. 1888).
169.
Many lawyers erroneously believe that a directed verdict is always unavailable
when the legal issue is "reasonable" behavior, but the practice of mixed question sufficiency
review shows that this is not the case. The judge may direct a verdict if the facts provable by
the plaintiff would not be sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant acted unreasonably; i.e., in the clear cases, the judge may direct a verdict.
170.
See Weiner, supra note 168, at 1875.
171.
See HOLMES, supra note 166, at 123. Holmes further noted this complexity:
The trouble with many cases of negligence is, that they are of a kind not
frequently recurring, so as to enable any given judge to profit by long
experience with juries to lay down rules, and that the elements are so
complex that courts are glad to leave the whole matter in a lump for the
jury's determination.
Id. at 129.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNI!VERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 30

fluence on future cases. Similar cases should be decided similarly, and
cases with stronger facts for the side that won in the first case should also
be decided similarly. The decisions may have analogical value for courts
applying the same standard in a different, but arguably similar, factual context. 72 For example, if one court determines that a use of a particular product should have been "reasonably anticipated" by the manufacturer as a
matter of law, a future court should be bound to conclude the same. As a
result, if one defines "the law" as the body of useful precedent, mixed question decisions are, in this sense, part of the law.
The normative nature of the mixed question, and the precedential force
given to mixed question decisions, crucially impact the Erie analysis. In the
first place, it means that mixed question decisions made by judges are certainly binding under Erie's constitutional holding. A decision holding that a
certain set of facts measures up to a legal standard defines a rule of conduct
just as much as the pure rule of law in Erie. An independent federal decision would repeat the original Erie mistake by erecting a second system of
state substantive law for diversity litigants, which is beyond the power of
both Congress and the federal courts.
In fact, one might say that the bindingness of mixed question decisions
is the closest possible question to Erie itself, and in some cases nigh indistinguishable. 173 Indeed, before Erie, opponents of Swift v. Tyson-including
the authors of numerous law review articles cited favorably in Erie itselfcriticized the federal courts for failing to follow state court mixed question
decisions. 74 The fact that the Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed
172.
See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698 (1996) (holding that a Court of
Appeals should review a probable-cause determination de novo). The Ornelas Court reasoned:
It is true that because the mosaic which is analyzed for a reasonablesuspicion or probable-cause inquiry is multi-faceted, "one determination
will seldom be a useful 'precedent' for another." But there are exceptions ....
And even where one case may not squarely control another
one, the two decisions when viewed together may usefully add to the
body of law on the subject.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
503 (1984) ("'Reckless disregard,' it is true, cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible
definition. Inevitably its outer limits will be marked out through case-by-case adjudication,
as is true with so many legal standards for judging concrete cases, whether the standard is
provided by the Constitution, statutes, or case law."); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d
1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 1984) (observing that the application of law to fact in Fourth Amendment exigent circumstances determination is of "clear precedential importance").
173.
See Weiner, supra note 168, at 1924 ("[W]hen law application is performed by
a judge, it takes on aspects of law declaration; the result of the specific application is to
establish a principle applicable to future cases.").
174.
See Charles I. Dawson, Conflict of Decisions Between State andFederal Courts
in Kentucky, and the Remedy, 20 Ky. L.J. 3, 7 (1931) (criticizing divergence between state
and federal courts on application of the fellow servant rule); Note, Aftermath of the Supreme
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this question and has moved on to more exotic Erie issues should not cast
any doubt on the analysis. 175 Mixed question decisions may be particularis-

Court'sStop, Look, and Listen Rule, 43 HARV. L. REv. 926, 932 (1930); William M. Meigs,
Decisions of the Federal Courts on Questions of State Law, 8 S. L. REV. 452, 464 (1882)
(criticizing federal courts that refused to follow state court interpretations of particular contracts or instruments). Meigs noted this problematic effect:
This departure from the general rule must undoubtedly, in any case
where they construe the instrument in a different way from the State
court, have the result of producing two rules of property as to the same
matter within the same territorial limits-and this, too, in the cases cited,
in relation to real estate.
Id.; see also William M. Meigs, Decisions of the Federal Courts on Questions of State Law,
45 AM. L. REv. 47, 71 (1911) (criticizing state courts that used Swift v. Tyson as a license to
declare the general law of other states by specifically scrutinizing a Georgia decision that
refused to treat Alabama cases applying the fellow servant rule as binding in a case governed
by Alabama law).
Before Erie, the federal courts reached independent conclusions on several
different kinds of mixed questions, most notably, the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur and the application of the fellow servant rule. See City of Chicago v. Robbins, 67
U.S. 418, 428 (1862) (holding that a nuisance question involving "the application of common law rules" was a matter of general law); see also Chicago, M & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Ross,
112 U.S. 377, 395 (1884) (conducting a fact-sensitive analysis of whether two individuals
were under common employment for purposes of fellow servant rule, relying on cases from
many states), overruled by New England R. Co. v. Conroy, 175 U.S. 323 (U.S. 1899); Yates
v. City of Milwaukee, 77 U.S. 497, 506 (1870) ("This question of dedication ... was one of
fact, to be determined by ascertaining the intention of those who laid out the lots, from what
they did, and from the application of general common law principles to their acts. This does
not depend upon State statute or local State law. The law which governs the case is the
common law, on which this court has never acknowledged the right of the State courts to
control our decisions .... ); H. Parker Sharp & Joseph B. Brennan, The Application of the
Doctrine of Swift v. Tyson Since 1900, 4 IND. L.J. 367, 377 (1929) ("The liability of a master for personal injuries to a servant is, in the absence of a state statute, a matter of general
law. Federal courts will not be bound by state decisions as to to [sic] whether a man is a vice
principal or a fellow servant.").
175.
One might argue that mixed question decisions are too particularistic to affect
primary conduct and, therefore, do not produce the evils that motivated the Erie decision. In
the first place, that is empirically inaccurate: many mixed question decisions do have precedential value, for the reasons discussed above, and thus may have an effect on primary conduct.
Second, the effect of mixed question decisions on primary behavior is beside the
point, because the "affects primary conduct" test is not an accurate statement of Erie's constitutional holding. This test was developed by commentators (and picked up by Justice
Harlan in his Hanna concurrence) as a candidate limiting principle for RDA questions. See
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that state practice should control "if the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary decisions
respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation"). This
limiting principle did nothing (and could have done nothing) to shake the original holding of
Erie, that Congress (and ergo the federal courts) does not have the authority to regulate by
half measures, through promulgating rules of conduct that apply in diversity jurisdiction but
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tic, and may often be easily distinguishable, but the federal courts must
reckon with them rather than disregard them entirely.
And if mixed question decisions are binding under the constitutional
holding, then the boundary-marking mixed question sufficiency decisionsjudges' decisions on what constitute "clear cases"-must be as well. To set
the boundary, the judge must determine whether the standard possibly extends to the facts of the case, itself a normative judgment. As Holmes recognized long ago:
When a judge rules that there is no evidence of negligence,
he does something more than is embraced in an ordinary
ruling that there is no evidence of a fact. He rules that the
acts or omissions proved or in question do not constitute a
ground of legal liability, and in this way the law is gradually enriching itself from daily life, as it should .... On the
other hand, if the court should rule that certain acts or
omissions coupled with damage were conclusive evidence
of negligence unless explained, it would, in substance and
in truth, rule that such acts or omissions were a ground
of
176
be.
might
case
the
as
recovery,
a
prevented
or
liability,
Because the judge only decides the "clear" cases, mixed question sufficiency decisions reveal even less about state substantive law than mixed
question decisions do. 17 7 But they still reveal something. They police the
boundaries of the abstract standards, and thus illuminate the outer limits of
state law. Just as Congress cannot legislate answers to mixed questions that
apply only in federal courts, it cannot legislate different boundariesfor state
law standards. Ergo, the federal courts are precluded, constitutionally, from
reaching conclusions that differ from the state court decisions in this area.
The practical advice for a federal court is simple: it must reach decisions that are consistent with the mixed question sufficiency decisions in
the state courts. If a relevant state court opinion directed a verdict in favor
of a party, then the federal court must direct a verdict on analogous facts or
facts that are weaker for that party. On the other hand, if a relevant state
court opinion refused to direct a verdict, then the federal court should refuse

not in state court jurisdiction. Furthermore, the limiting principle was not even adopted as
the prevailing RDA test, but was rejected in favor of the "twin aims" test in Hanna.
176.
HOLMES, supra note 166, at 120-21.
177.
The judge's function is a kind of reasonableness review, much like a federal
district court's function when it applies the habeas statute to determine whether a state court
decision was an "unreasonable application" of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)

(2000).
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to direct a verdict on analogous facts or facts stronger for that party. 178
Simply put, the federal court must accept that what the state courts think are
"clear" cases are in fact clear.
Numerous federal appellate decisions have given binding force to state
mixed question sufficiency opinions. For example, in Jewell v. CSX Transportation,Inc., the jury question was whether a particular railroad crossing
was "extra-hazardous."' 179 The plaintiff argued that she had presented sufficient evidence to create a jury question on "extra-hazardous," including the
fact that (a) the angle between road and track was acute, requiring an awkward movement to look down the track; (b) the setting sun created significant glare; (c) the angle brought the track into the vehicle's blind spot; and
(d) the narrow crossing, elevated railroad bed, and ruts in the road, distracted drivers from the oncoming train.' 80 The Sixth Circuit examined the
Kentucky sufficiency cases on the issue of "extra-hazardous," and found
that Kentucky courts routinely direct verdicts for the defendant on the "extra-hazardous" issue when the plaintiff has not produced evidence of a
physical obstruction that prevented him from seeing the train.' 81 The court
accordingly concluded that it was required to direct a verdict for the defendant, given the absence of any evidence of a physical obstruction.182
The result of this case depended crucially on the Kentucky mixed
question sufficiency cases. Without the Kentucky cases, the Sixth Circuit's
interpretation of "extra-hazardous" was not a necessary one. The plaintiff's
reading was plausible. It is certainly not beyond the pale to say that an acute
angle, setting sun, and blind spot make a crossing extra-hazardous. But the
Kentucky cases policing the boundaries of the standard reflected a policy
choice: that it does not promote safety to hold railroads liable for failing to
178.
One might ask whether a jury's ultimate resolution of the mixed question should
be binding in federal court. The answer is "no," because no state court treats a particular jury
verdict as having precedential value on the particular point of law. See Weiner, supra note
168, at 1875. Indeed, in most cases, both the historical facts and the mixed question are
disputed, so the rationale for the jury's decision is not clear and it is not possible to assign
precedential value. State courts do treat mixed question sufficiency decisions as having
precedential value, for what they are worth. See id.at 1875 n.37.
179.
135 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 1998). If the crossing had been extra-hazardous, the
Court noted that the railroad would have been required to put additional signals at the crossing:
The rationale of the extra-hazardous crossing doctrine is that there are
some circumstances under which the ordinarily prudent person would
not be sufficiently alerted by the usual and statutory signals and would
not appreciate the degree of danger involved unless given greater warning of the actual approach of a train.
Id. at 363.
180.
Id.
181.
Id.at 364.
182.
Id.at 365.
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take extraordinary precautions unless there is a physical obstruction blocking drivers' view of an oncoming train. Under Erie's constitutional holding,
this policy choice binds the federal courts. It would have created a dual
system of state substantive law if the Sixth Circuit had allowed a jury to
conclude that the crossing was extra-hazardous in a case not involving a
physical obstruction.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in FederalKemper Life Assurance Co.
v. FirstNational Bank of Birmingham similarly illustrates the proper effect
of state decisions refusing to direct a verdict on a mixed question. 83 In
Alabama, an insured must disclose to the insurer diseases that "materially
increased the risk of loss."' 84 Some Alabama cases had held that certain
conditions materially increase the risk of loss as a matter of law, such that
no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. 185 These diseases included
cancer, Hodgkin's Disease, and tuberculosis.' 86 Other Alabama cases, however, had refused to rule on the issue, as a matter of law, in cases involving
syphilis, cirrhosis, pregnancy, and cataracts. 187 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs condition-an ileostomy-was far more similar
to syphilis or cirrhosis than it was to cancer or tuberculosis. 188 The court
therefore properly refused to hold that no reasonable jury could conclude
otherwise. 189 Directing a verdict would have cut off liability in a case where
the state courts would not have done so, with the effect of creating a dual
system of law, in violation of Erie's constitutional holding.
Many other federal appellate decisions use state mixed question sufficiency decisions in a similar way.190 These courts intuit that the state deci183.
712 F.2d 459 (11 th Cir. 1983).
184. Id. at 462.
185.
Id.at 463.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 712 F.2d at 464.
189. Id.
190.
See, e.g., Billiar v. Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co., 623 F.2d 240, 246 (2d Cir.
1980) (using New York cases to determine if it was proper to submit to the jury the issue of

whether the plaintiff was a "knowledgeable user" of a dangerous product); John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 585 F.2d 1289, 1292-93 (5th Cir. 1978) (sending a case to the
jury and relying on Georgia cases to determine whether a husband who beat his wife should
have anticipated fatal response); Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 506 F.2d
976, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1975) (sending to jury on basis of Alabama cases construing "reason-

able time" for insured to provide notice of suit to insurer); Wilson v. Nooter Corp., 475 F.2d
497, 501-02 (1st Cir. 1973) (reversing a directed verdict on a borrowed servant issue where
"[iun New Hampshire law it is for the jury to weigh the factors and decide which employer
exercised the right to control," and where no reported New Hampshire case had directed a
verdict on this ground); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Lumbert, 401 F.2d 699, 701 (10th Cir. 1968)
(sending to jury on basis of Wyoming cases holding that driver could have acted reasonably
even if he did not stop, look, and listen before crossing railroad track); Carman v. Harrison,
362 F.2d 694, 698-99 (8th Cir. 1966) (using Nebraska cases to mark out the meaning of
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sions define the boundaries of "reasonable" applications of state law, and
thus limit the discretion of federal courts. Though admittedly none of these
cases explicitly recognizes that the state decisions fall within Erie's constitutional holding, they put the lie to any notion that the judge-jury relationship is a federal enclave. In fact, use of the state decisions comes so naturally to these courts precisely because the decisions are part of state substantive law.
There exists, however, a significant number of cases where a federal
court of appeals has flatly refused to treat state court mixed question sufficiency decisions as binding. A recent example is the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Ellis v. Weasler EngineeringInc. 191 The historical facts were not in dispute: all the parties agreed that the plaintiff had been injured while inspecting a running pecan harvester. 92 The case involved only a mixed question:
whether a reasonable manufacturer should have anticipated that an operator
193
of its pecan harvester would inspect the machine while it was running.
The defendant argued that several, analogous state court cases indicated
that the use was not a reasonably anticipated one as a matter of law.194 One
state court had granted judgment as a matter of law where the plaintiff had
used the rear part of a folding chair seat as a step ladder; in another state
case, the plaintiff had intentionally inhaled propane gas to get high. 95 The
defendant also relied on previous Fifth Circuit cases where the court had
granted judgment as a matter of law on various questions of "reasonably
anticipated use.' 96
The Fifth Circuit could have easily distinguished the cases cited by the
defendant, which all involved uses that are obviously dangerous to an average person, in a way that inspecting a running pecan harvester may not be.
But rather than take the completely legitimate, common law approach of
distinguishing the cases, the Fifth Circuit denied that they ever had any
precedential force for a federal court:
[E]ach decision relied upon by Nut Hustler constitutes only
a finding of an adjudicative fact specific to that particular
"guest" in an automobile guest statute); Pinehurst, Inc. v. Schlamowitz, 351 F.2d 509, 51416 (4th Cir. 1965) (granting judgment as a matter of law to defendant on plaintiff's contention that failing to post night watchman at barn that burned down was negligent, relying on
North Carolina sufficiency cases); Metro. Coal Co. v. Johnson, 265 F.2d 173, 180-81 (1st
Cir. 1959) (directing a verdict for a coal company on basis of state decisions on whether a
defendant should have anticipated misconduct by children).
191.
258 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2001).
192.
Id. at 328.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.at 334.
195.
Id.at 335.
196.
Ellis, 258 F.3d at 336 n.12.
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case, viz., whether the claimant's damage in that particular
case arose from a reasonably expected use of the specific
product. Because each of the Louisiana decisions relied
upon by Nut Hustler with respect to the issue of reasonably
anticipated use is a decision making a finding of fact, rather
than a decision making or interpreting law, the jury, the
district court, and this court are not bound in this diversity
case by those state cases on their findings of facts with respect to the issue of reasonably anticipated use. 197
The Fifth Circuit utterly failed to recognize what Holmes noticed more
than a century ago-that state court opinions on mixed question sufficiency
do "make" and "interpret" law by determining whether the legal standard
does or does not extend to the facts of the particular case.
Other appellate cases have refused to treat state mixed question sufficiency decisions as binding. For example, one Fifth Circuit case involved
whether a defendant had adequately warned of danger at a work site. 198 A
Texas case had held that a warning is adequate, as a matter of law, if made
to the plaintiffs employer or foreman. 99 The Fifth Circuit flatly refused to
treat that Texas case as binding. 2°° Another case from the Fourth Circuit
involved the question of whether a plaintiff was contributorily negligent
when she ran into a plate glass panel. 20 1 The court refused to even consider
state cases holding that such an act may or may not constitute contributory
negligence as a matter of law.2 °2
These decisions-and the countless others like them that do not reach
the case reports (such as oral decisions by district judges)-represent an
Erie mistake of constitutional magnitude. A state court that directs (or refuses to direct) a verdict on a mixed question has concluded that the standard cannot (or can) extend to the facts of the case, and has thereby defined
the outer limits of that standard under state law. Not even Congress may
authorize departure from these state decisions in the federal courts. Congress could accomplish that result only by legislating rules that apply in
federal and state courts. A federal court should have no greater power than
Congress has.
197. Id. at 334; see also id. at 340. ("[A]s indicated in our discussion of the distinction between interpretations of law and findings of fact in Louisiana cases, the findings of
fact on the issue of reasonably anticipated use in Nut Hustler's case sample do not constitute
creations or interpretations of Louisiana law. Therefore, those factual findings are not binding on federal courts or juries in diversity cases.").
198.
Gray v. Martindale Lumber Co., 515 F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th Cir. 1975).
199. Id. at 1220.
200. Id.
201.
Brant v. Robinson Inv. Co., 435 F.2d 1345, 1346 (4th Cir. 1971).
202. Id. at 1346-47.
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How are these courts erring so egregiously? First, they appear not to
recognize that mixed question decisions are normative. For example, the
Ellis court assumed that such decisions do not "make" or "interpret" law.
As the reasoning above and the quotes from Holmes show, this is not true.
Second, these courts' decisions are products of the same misconceptions about Byrd that I explored in Part I-namely, that it establishes a federal monopoly over issues that affect the distribution of authority between
judge and jury. For example, the Fifth Circuit cases that disregarded mixed
question sufficiency decisions all cited Boeing Co. v. Shipman, and all the
Fourth Circuit cases cited Boeing's analogue in that circuit, Wratchford v.
S.J. Groves & Sons Co., for the proposition that state law cannot affect the
judge-jury relationship in federal courts. 203 Boeing and Wratchford are two
of the chief examples of the "enclave" theory of judge-jury relations. They
predate Gasperini,and cannot survive its holding that judge-jury issues can
be governed by state law.
More fundamentally, as I demonstrated in Part I, Byrd does not even
purport to apply where Erie's constitutional holding is involved. To the
contrary, not applying the state rule here raises a serious constitutional issue. Byrd itself recognized as much, by taking care to specify that the state
rule at issue in that case was not "bound up" with traditional state substance. 204 The state rules I am talking about here are more than "bound up
with" state substance: in a very real sense, they are state substance. By disregarding them, the Ellis, Gray, and Brant courts violated the Constitution.
As a coda to this section, it is appropriate to mention that the bindingness of state mixed question sufficiency opinions solves the riddle of a Supreme Court decision that has long puzzled commentators, Stoner v. New
York Life Insurance Co. 20 5 The facts are as follows: an accident had generated parallel litigation in state and federal court involving the issue of
whether the plaintiff had experienced "total disability"; 20 6 two state courts
had held that the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence of "total disability" within the meaning of his insurance policy; 20 7 and despite these rulings,
in the federal action,,, the208judge directed a verdict against the plaintiff on the
"total disability issue. The Supreme Court reversed in a short opinion,
noting that in state court, "[e]ach time respondent argued that petitioner's
203.
See, e.g., Ellis v. Weasler Eng'g Inc., 258 F.3d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1969)); Gray, 515 F.2d at 1221
(citing Shipman, 411 F.2d at 369-70); Brant, 435 F.2d at 1347 (citing Wratchford v. S. J.
Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1969)).
204.
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958).
205.
311 U.S. 464 (1940).
206.
Id. at 465-66.
207.
Id. at 466.
208.
Id. at 467.
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evidence failed to present a submissible case. Each time the Kansas City
Court of Appeals expressly stated that the evidence as to total disability
presented a question for the jury. ' 20 9 Stoner thus appears to recognize the
bindingness of state mixed question sufficiency decisions.
Many commentators, however, in thrall to the received wisdom which
maintained that sufficiency was always judged by federal standards, have
not known what to make of Stoner's insistence that the state-sufficiency
cases were binding. They often tried to write it off as a law of the case opinion; that is, because the same issues had already been decided between the
same parties, they should not have been re-litigated.2 1 °
But the reasoning of Stoner is not consistent with a law-of-the-case interpretation. The Court said:
We have recently held that in cases where jurisdiction rests
on diversity of citizenship, federal courts, under the doctrine of Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins, must follow the decisions of intermediate state courts in the absence of convincing evidence that the highest court of the state would
decide differently. In particular this is true where the intermediate state court has determined the precise question in
issue in an earlier suit between the same parties, and the
highest court of the state has refused review.21'
The Court was not relying on law of the case principles; it was giving
the intermediate state decisions precedentialforce. Confirming this, later in
the opinion, the Court cited sufficiency opinions from the Missouri Supreme Court to argue that "the Missouri Supreme Court likewise would
conclude that a finding of total disability here is supported by the evidence. 212 If it was merely relying on law of the case reasoning, what the
Missouri Supreme Court would have done was irrelevant; only what had
actually happened in the case would have mattered. This too made it clear
that the Court recognized the bindingness of the sufficiency opinions.
Though this case, decided shortly after Erie itself, and long before the
core RDA opinions, is not a model of clarity, it contains the Supreme
Court's recognition of a basic truth: mixed question sufficiency opinions
are binding because they mark the boundaries of state standards for primary
liability, and thus fall within the original constitutional holding of Erie.1 3
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
a question

Id. at 467-68.
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2325.
Stoner, 311 U.S. at 467 (citation omitted).
Id. at 469.
Ignoring the state decisions is even more egregious when it results in removing
from the jury that would have gone to the jury in a state court. Commentators
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In addition, as demonstrated earlier, historical fact sufficiency opinions
bind a federal court because divergent approaches to recurring facts would
seriously undermine the twin aims of Erie. Though the amendment to Rule
50 means that federal law provides the abstract sufficiency standard, state
law should shape the application of that standard.
III. ALLOCATION OF ISSUES TO JUDGE OR JURY

Sufficiency of the evidence standards demonstrate two of the three
ways state law may influence the judge-jury relationship in federal courts:
under Erie's constitutional holding and under Hanna'sRDA test. A second
important judge-jury issue-the allocation of questions to judge or juryimplicates all three. This is an area that lies in the shadow of the Seventh
Amendment, and if Byrd ever supplies an independent RDA test, it is
here.214 Still, even when Byrd applies, the federal rule might not necessarily
win if Byrd's balancing test is to be taken seriously.
To this point, however, commentators have taught that state law has no
influence on issue allocation. For example, the Wright and Miller treatise
says, "After the decisions handed down by the Supreme Court in the line of
cases discussed above, the complete dominance of federal law in the area of
jury trial rights clearly had been established., 215 The two cases relied upon
by the treatise (and by the cases cited therein) for that proposition are Byrd
and Simler v. Conner.2 16 Neither case supports this treatise's position.
have long recognized that directed verdicts can cloak a judge's own value choices in the

mantle of "reasonable jury behavior." See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397

(1943) (Black, J., dissenting); Bohlen, supra note 159, at 118-19 (noting that it is tempting

for judges to enforce own social views by directing verdicts under the guise of "reasonable"

jury conclusions); Thayer, supra note 159, at 163 ("In handling this keen-edged instrument,
the demurrer to evidence, it is more than likely that the just line between the duties of court
and jury was often overstepped by assuming that what the court thought the right inference
was the only one allowable to the jury."). This kind of error is regrettable in any case. The
error is compounded when the federal judge is not only enforcing his own views at the expense of the jury, but is ignoring state policy in violation of Erie to boot.
214.
Notably, at least one distinguished commentator agrees with me that Byrd left
open the question of whether Erie requires a federal court to follow a state's allocation of a
particular mixed question to judge or jury. See Weiner, supra note 168, at 1910 n.2 13 (noting specifically with reference to the question of a reasonable time issue in a contract case,
upon which state courts disagree).
215.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2303.
216.
Id.(relying upon both Simler v. Conner,372 U.S. 221 (1963), and Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). For a sample of the many cases
cited by Wright and Miller that rely on Byrd and Simler, see InternationalFinancial Serv-

ices Corp. v. Chromas Technologies Canada,Inc., 356 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2004); Gran-

ite State Insurance Co. v. Smart Modular Technologies, Inc., 76 F.3d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir.
1996); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185, 1189 (3d Cir. 1979);
Halladayv. Verschoor, 381 F.2d 100, 109 (8th Cir. 1967).
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The per curiam Simler opinion actually has little, or nothing, to say
about the issue at hand because it is a rather ordinary Seventh Amendment
opinion, not an Erie opinion at all.217 The Seventh Amendment right to jury
trial turns on whether a claim is "legal" or "equitable": if the claim is legal,
then jury trial is required in federal court, but if it is equitable, then bench
trial is permissible. The lower court in Simler had turned to state law to
determine whether a claim was "legal" or "equitable" for Seventh Amendment purposes.21 8 The Court held, unsurprisingly, that the use of state law
in this context was improper:
We agree with respondent that the right to a jury trial in the
federal courts is to be determined as a matter of federal law
in diversity as well as other actions. .

.

.Only through a

holding that the jury trial right is to be determined according to federal law can the uniformity in its exercise which
is demanded by the Seventh Amendment be achieved....
[T]he characterization of that state-created claim as legal or
equitable for purposes of whether a right to jury219
trial is inlaw.
federal
to
recourse
by
made
be
must
dicated

Simler held only that the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial is governed
by a federal test. 220 It did not hold that issue allocation is invariably governed by federal law. The quote most often lifted from Simler-that "the
right to a jury trial in the federal courts is to be determined as a matter of
federal law"-is addressing only the Seventh Amendmentfloor on the right
to a jury trial, and says that floor is determined by federal law. 22' Simler
nowhere purports to say what happens when the Seventh Amendment does
not apply.
The Seventh Amendment does not require all issues to go to the jury,
and Simler is entirely silent about the effect of state practice in those areas.
For example, when the state cause of action is equitable, the Seventh
Amendment does not require jury trial. What effect should state law have
then? Similarly, the Supreme Court has never held that the Seventh Amendment requires the allocation of mixed questions to the jury-even in "legal"
actions. Here too, state law might have some influence, and Simler does not
address the question. In these areas, state practice should arguably have
some influence, and Simler does not provide the answer.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Simler, 372 U.S. 221.
Id.at 223.
Id.at 222.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 222.
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The other case relied upon to demonstrate the supposed hegemony of
federal law is Byrd. Unlike Simler, Byrd is at least an Erie decision, rather
than a Seventh Amendment decision. But, as shown in Part I, Byrd does not
come close to mandating a federal monopoly. The best reading is that it is
coextensive with the Hanna test. At the very most, Byrd indicates that an
alternative to Hanna may be proper where the state rule raises a substantial
constitutional issue in federal court. Moreover, even if the Byrd-balancing
test does apply, the state rule could still conceivably come out on top if the
state interest and potential for outcome disparity are sufficiently strong.
This Gasperini-influencedinterpretation of Byrd instantly indicates a
role for state law in areas where the allocation of questions between judge
and jury raises no substantial constitutional question. In the first place, if
the state allocates a question (mixed or historical) to the jury, then the state
rule could not conceivably raise a constitutional question. No part of the
Constitution provides a right to a bench trial in federal court. Accordingly, a
state rule allocating to the jury can never raise a substantial constitutional
question, and the Hanna test must apply. That test would normally indicate
use of the state rule, because disregarding the state allocation to the jury
would often violate twin aims. The ability to get to a jury is almost always
to one party's strategic advantage. If the federal system allocated to the
judge, it would often cause forum-shopping and inequity, in violation of
222
twin aims.
Similarly, where it is clear that a state law claim is equitable rather
than legal (a question that is, for Seventh Amendment purposes, one of federal law), 223 the Seventh Amendment does not require a jury trial. Regardless of whether the state allocates the question to judge or jury, the state
rule presents no substantial constitutional question, and Hanna should mandate use of the state rule.224
These should be easy Erie questions. Federal courts should have no interest in denying litigants a right to a jury trial when they would enjoy one
222. The identity of a decision maker of course often impacts litigation strategy. See
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (concluding that access to
arbitration is governed by state law when not governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, because "[tihe nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an important part of the parcel of
rights behind a cause of action. The change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may
make a radical difference in ultimate result").
223. See Simler, 372 U.S. at 222.
224. Many of federal cases cited by Wright and Miller fail to understand this. See
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2303. Relying on Simler, they seem to think that once
the claim is denominated legal or equitable, the game is over. To the contrary, Simler only
governs whether a jury trial is required under the Seventh Amendment. It does not mandate
use of a judge in all other instances; it could not, as the Constitution does not provide a right
to bench trial. And Simler has nothing to say about whether, under the Erie doctrine, a federal court should heed a state practice that is more jury-favorable than the federal custom.
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in state court. And federal courts should have no need to insist on a jury
trial where the Seventh Amendment plainly does not require it, and when
such insistence introduces substantial disparities between the state and federal forum, in violation of twin aims. The courts have gotten carried away
by a few expansive lines in Byrd and Simler, which provide no warrant for
a blatant twin-aims violation.
The really difficult question arises only when the state allocates a
question to the judge, but the claim is clearly legal (or at least not clearly
equitable). Then the state rule may raise a difficult constitutional question if
applied in federal court. Byrd itself may be an example of this sort of case.
There, it was not clear whether the right to trial by jury applied to "statutory
employer" issues. 225 The Court avoided answering the constitutional question by holding that federal law controlled as a matter of non-constitutional
law. 226 An independent Byrd test could apply in these Seventh Amendmentshadowed areas.
In Byrd, the Court actually did not specify whether the Court of Appeals erred because it decided disputed factual issues for itself, or whether it
also erred because it decided the mixed question by applying "statutory
employer" to the facts. Later Fourth Circuit cases opted for the former interpretation, and continued to allocate the mixed question to the judge, following state practice. But a mixed question could also raise Seventh
Amendment concerns if the state allocates it to the judge. The United States
Supreme Court has never held that any mixed question must go to the jury,
but noted two open Seventh Amendment questions in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., a federal question case: (1) "the extent to which the
Seventh Amendment can be said to have crystallized a law/fact distinction,"
which could preclude allocation of certain mixed questions to judges in
federal court; and (2) "whether post-1791 precedent classifying an issue as
one of fact would trigger the protections of the Seventh Amendment if
(unlike this case) there were no more specific reason for decision., 227 A
state practice of allocating a mixed question to the judge could conceivably
raise either question. If it did, then under my reconciliation of Byrd and
Gasperini,Byrd-balancing may be in order.
I say "may be in order" because a state rule may not be in the RDA
"zone" of Erie questions. If the state rule is substantive or bound up with
substantive rights, the Byrd constitutional avoidance canon is useless. The
court cannot avoid the constitutional question through interpreting the
RDA, but is instead faced with a clash of the titans: Erie, purporting to re-

225.
226.
227.

See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537-39 (1958).
See id.
517 U.S. 370, 384 n.10 (1996).
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quire the court to follow the state allocation to the judge, and the Seventh
Amendment, pointing toward the jury. One principle has to yield.228
There is good reason to believe that state allocations of mixed questions often are substantive or bound up with substantive rights. The task of
applying law to fact is a fundamentally normative task. States often allocate
to judge or jury, not for procedural reasons related to the convenient and
fair administration of justice, but rather to take advantage of the special
229
norms that judges or jurors are perceived to bring to the task . 9 States deliberately shape the contours of rights by importing the norms of the judge
or the jury. When the allocation serves this purpose, it is at the very least
"bound up with" state substantive law.
Juries, for example, are commonly thought to decide mixed questions
in light of popular values, ordinary experience, common sense, and notions
of fair play on the facts of particular cases; while judges are thought to rule
on the basis of policy, principle, and concern for the prospective importance
of the decision in the individual case. 230 As Holmes somewhat resignedly
put it in one of his later works, after he had failed to persuade the world that
judges should decide all mixed questions:
[O]ne reason why I believe in our practice of leaving questions of negligence to [the jury] ... is what is precisely one
228.

In Byrd, this difficulty was patently absent. The Court concluded that the state

rule was purely procedural, and not "bound up" with any substantive right (where substance
is understood in its traditional sense). See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-38 ("The policy of uniform
enforcement of state-created rights and obligations cannot in every case exact compliance

with a state rule-not bound up with rights and obligations-which disrupts the federal
system of allocating functions between judge and jury.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted)
(footnote omitted); see also C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 1997 BYU L. REV. 267, 276 (1997) ("Byrd makes clear that the
Court was concerned only with a rule of pure "form and mode," which the Court had explicitly determined had no underlying substantive or extralitigation policy objectives. To carry

this narrow principle further to permit an open-ended and undefined balancing process to
displace state rules that do have important extralitigation objectives would be more than an
unwarranted extension of Byrd. Such a result would erode the core holding of Erie itself-

that it would be unconstitutional for Congress, and a fortiori the courts, to displace state law
with a federal rule of decision in areas of legislative policymaking that the Constitution has
reserved to the States.").
229. Of course, even when the issue goes to the jury, the judge retains the authority
to cut off the "unreasonable ends" of the spectrum. Accordingly, in that range, the choice of
judge or jury does not affect substantive outcomes. Within the range of reasonableness,
however, the choice of judge or jury can drastically affect the distribution of outcomes.
230. The different role of the jury in torts and contracts cases has been recognized
since Thayer's time. See Thayer, supra note 159, at 160-61; see also Pound, supra note 165,
at 957 (arguing that the law relating to transactions demands clear rules while the law relat-

ing to "individual human life" should be contained in standards); Weiner, supra note 168, at
1888 (arguing that juries are more capable than the judge in determining negligence).
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of their gravest defects from the point of view of their theoretical function: that they will introduce into their verdict a
certain amount-a very large amount, so far as I have observed-of popular prejudice, and thus keep the administration of the law in accord with the wishes and feelings of
the community.23 1
Or as Professor Gergen more succinctly put it: "[T]hat an issue is put to the
jury indicates that we want (or at least are satisfied with) the answer of ordinary intuitive morality. That an issue is put to the judge indicates that we
want an answer based on policy or principle. 232
The allocation of mixed questions in common law actions tends to be
based on the effect the allocation will have on the shape of the right. In contract law, mixed questions normally go to the judge, because the judge is
thought to be more familiar with the norms of the commercial community,
and thus brings stability, predictability, and rational decision making to the
task of applying the rules of law.233 In torts, mixed questions typically go to
the jury, which is thought to be best situated to discover the relevant
norm-the proper behavior of the ordinary person. 234 In a nineteenth century case, the Supreme Court recognized the normative nature of the allocation to the jury in negligence cases:

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L.
185, 197 (Richard A. Posner ed.
1992); see also Louis, supra note 168, at 1012 (claiming that the jury often gets a mixed
question because of "its inclination to ignore unpopular law, to render compromise verdicts,
to redistribute the wealth of corporate and governmental defendants, and in general to render
a rough cut brand of justice").
232. Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in DecidingNormative Issues in the American
Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 417 (1999); see also HOLMES, supra note 231, at
197 ("When the circumstances are too special and complicated for a general rule to be laid
down the jury may be called in.").
233. See Thayer, supra note 159, at 160-61; see also Gergen, supra note 232, at 441
(stating that society gives issues to juries when society wants answers based on "intuitive
morality" as opposed to when society gives issues to the judge because society wants answers based on "policy and principle"); Louis, supra note 168, at 1032 (arguing that the
judge applies the law in commercial cases because of "the legal profession's fear of jurors
and their tendency to render a rough cut, ad hoc, and therefore uncertain brand of justice").
234.
See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1058
(1964) ("[T]he jury with its common sense and feel of the community is the 'expert' tribunal
for the two great distinctive issues posed by the common law: drawing the profile of negligence and handling the individual pricing of damages."). Holmes thought a judge could,
over time, develop a capacity for applying the negligence standard. See HOLMES, supra note
166, at 124. But the rejection of his view in nearly every jurisdiction represents a decision
that a jury has best access to the norms needed to decide the question. See Gergen, supra
note 232, at 435-36.
231.

REV. 443 (1899), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES
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Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising
men of education and men of little education, men of learning and men whose learning consists only in what they
have themselves seen and heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult,
apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to the
facts proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus given it is the great effort of the law to
obtain. It is assumed that twelve men know more of the
common affairs of life than does one man, that they can
draw wiser and safer conclusions 235from admitted facts thus
occurring than can a single judge.
Rights on the boundary between contract and tort can take on vastly
different shapes depending on whether the judge or the jury applies the law.
The judge most often decides whether a business has committed an unfair
and deceptive trade practice, and the allocation is justified on the basis of
the predictability this ensures.2 36 One can imagine how different that right
would be if the jury applied its notions of what practices are "unfair and
deceptive." An area where the states differ substantially is the contractual
duty of good faith and fair dealing. If a jurisdiction assigns the contractual
duty of good faith and fair dealing to a jury, then the defendant's behavior
will likely be judged on the basis of traditional popular morality. If the
question is assigned to the judge, the decision will likely be based on more
constrained rules of commercial behavior, such as honesty and the reasonable use of discretionary power under the contract.237 The right may have
the same name, but will take on a drastically different meaning depending
on who gets to apply the law.238
It is true that the allocation of mixed questions may have procedural
rationales as well. Allocating a mixed question to the jury saves time and
conserves judicial resources: one might think that judges' time is better
spent managing cases and announcing pure rules of law, instead of crafting
opinions on more fact-bound issues with limited precedential value. 239 It
was long thought (and may still be true) that the jury enjoys greater immuSioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873).
235.
Gergen, supra note 232, at 465-67.
236.
See id. at 451-52, 456-57.
237.
238.
For example, cases in Montana and North Carolina hold that the judge may
apply the law to the facts in negligence cases. Id. at 434 n. 121; see also Weiner, supra note
168, at 1896 (noting that courts are divided on whether reasonable time in contract law is for
the judge or jury); id. at 1917 (recognizing that courts are divided on who applies the probable cause standard in a false imprisonment case).
See Weiner, supra note 168, at 1889.
239.
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nity from corruption. 240 Finally, using the jury rather than the judge avoids
the creation of a body of precedent, which may be desirable to preserve
flexibility and adaptability in the law over time. 4' Alternatively, a jurisdiction might choose the judge specifically for the purpose of creating precedent in planning-heavy areas like contract law. These reasons all have little
to do with substantive outcomes, and are instead fairly classed as procedural considerations related to the fair and efficient disposition of judicial
business. Do they make the allocation decision "rationally classifiable" as
procedure, removing it from the constitutional domain and making it subject to the Byrd avoidance canon?
Not necessarily. Allocation rules intended to shape the contours of a
substantive right still remain "bound up with" state substance. It simply
cannot be true that the merest procedural rationale gives Congress the authority to displace state law rules that are "substantive" or "bound up with"
state substance. Otherwise, even the rule in Erie would be vulnerable. A
rule of "no liability to trespassers along railroad tracks" saves time and
judicial resources, compared with a rule that imposes a duty of care. But
that slim procedural rationale cannot give Congress the authority to replace
the duty identified in Erie. Moreover, rules "bound up with" state substance, such as burdens of proof and choice of law rules, have possible procedural rationales too, but are thought to be so closely tied to the substance
of the state law right that not 242
even Congress should be able to selectively
abrogate them in federal court.
Thus, it seems clear that for at least some mixed questions, the normatively grounded allocation to judge or jury should be enough to shift the
question into the constitutional domain of rules "bound up with" state law.
Negligence is the clearest example.243 If Congress or the federal courts
240. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 563-64 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
The strongest argument in [the jury's] favour is, that it is a security
against corruption. As there is always more time and better opportunity
to tamper with a standing body of magistrates than with a jury summoned for the occasion, there is room to suppose that a corrupt influence
would more easily find its way to the former than to the latter.
Id.; see also Charles W. Wolfram, The ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REv. 639, 708-09 (1972) (noting that one purpose of the Seventh Amendment was
to guard against oppressive and corrupt judges).
241.
Of course, the state may have chosen the judge for the purpose of creating a
stable body of precedent to guide planning behavior. This may be a major reason for allocating certain questions in business law to the judge. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-90 (1996).
242.
See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
243.
See Gergen, supra note 232, at 484 ("In the United States, the bedrock principle
in negligence can be put this way: if a person acts in a way that foreseeably physically harms
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could allocate application of the negligence standard of care to the judge,
then the very nature of that right would change because the right is tied up
with the fact that the jury applies the law. The same holds true for other
claims where the nature of the right depends on the identity of the decision
maker; for example, the duty of good faith and fair dealing, or the cause of
action for unfair and deceptive trade practices, which depend crucially on
whether the judge or jury apply the law.244 The nature of the substantive
right depends on the allocation, which should shift the Erie question into
the constitutional "zone."
In fact, in a case actually cited in Byrd, the Supreme Court recognized
that issue allocation may, in a real sense, form part of the substantive right.
In a Federal Employees Liability Act case, the Ohio Supreme Court had
held that state practice allocated the issue of fraud in the execution of a release to the judge.245 The Supreme Court reversed:
We have previously held that "The right to trial by jury
is... part and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers under the Employers' Liability Act.". . . It follows that
the right to trial by jury is too substantial a part of the rights
accorded by the Act to permit it to be classified as a mere
"local rule of procedure" for denial in the manner that Ohio
has here used. 24
Byrd cited the case as one where the jury trial right was bound up with the
substantive right. It thus explicitly recognized that issue allocations can be
"part and parcel" of the substantive right.247 The same reasoning that made
the jury-trial right part of the FELA cause of action should mandate application of certain state law issue allocations in federal court.
Erie's constitutional holding thus likely requires courts to follow the
state allocation for at least some mixed questions, and if the state allocates
to the judge, the courts may have to confront the Seventh Amendment question instead of balancing away the state rule under Byrd. Which principleErie or the Seventh Amendment-should prevail?
I submit that the Seventh Amendment should not require allocation to
the jury in this situation. First, the federal courts routinely assign mixed
questions to the judge rather than the jury, without ever identifying a constitutional problem, suggesting that mixed question allocation does not even
his neighbor or his neighbor's property, and if the appropriateness of his conduct is at all in
doubt, then his neighbors will decide whether he should pay for the harm he caused.").
244.
See id.
245.
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952).

246.
247.

Id. at 363.

See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958).
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fall within the Seventh Amendment, which only applies to questions of
"fact." 248 Second, history provides no strong support for finding a constitutional problem. In 1791, there was no developed practice regarding the allocation of mixed questions. 249 The question was not discussed in Congress
or in the ratifying legislatures. 250 And Holmes was able to argue as late as
the early-twentieth century that the judge should decide all mixed questions.25'
Finally, where Erie-the foundational doctrine of modem federalism-requires use of the state allocation, the courts should be reluctant to
find that the Seventh Amendment requires a contrary result. The Seventh
Amendment was adopted on a federalism rationale: the states did not want
the federal courts to be able to abrogate state law rights to jury trial in diversity cases, and felt that features of Article III-including the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction to review questions of fact, and Congress's power to
create the lower federal courts-threatened that right.252 Its federalism rationale helps to explain why the Seventh Amendment is one of the very few
Bill of Rights guarantees to resist incorporation through the Fourteenth
248. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
249. See Weiner, supra note 168, at 1891-92 (arguing that there is no constitutional
right to a jury application of the reasonableness standard to the facts in negligence because
the tort did not exist in 1791, and other questions of reasonableness at the time were determined by the judge). Moreover, even in cases where there was a developed tradition in 1791,
the historical practice would not necessarily be binding under the Seventh Amendment. The
Seventh Amendment "was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in only its
most fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural forms and details, varying even
then so widely among common-law jurisdictions." Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372,
392 (1943).
250.
Edith G. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 289, 290 (1966) ("Nowhere in the history of the Philadelphia convention, the ratifying
conventions of the several states, or the specific 'legislative history' of the Bill of Rights can
any evidence be found that the relation of judge to jury was considered as affected in any but
the most general possible way by the seventh amendment, or even that it was considered at
all."); Wolfram, supra note 240, at 723, 730 (noting that neither Congress nor the ratifying
legislatures discussed the incidents of jury trial, such as whether mixed questions were required to go to jury); see also Louis, supra note 168, at 1008-09 (noting that the Seventh
Amendment "has never been construed to require the automatic submission to the jury of all
debatable mixed questions going to the merits. Indeed, on several occasions the United
States Supreme Court has eschewed the opportunity to so hold and has said only that assignment of mixed questions to the judge or jury is subject to the influence, but not necessarily the command, of the seventh amendment," but also arguing that some mixed questions
are "facts" that may not be taken from the jury).
251.
See HOLMES, supra note 166, at 125-26.
252. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 89 (1998) ("[T]he best reading of the
amendment is probably as follows: if a state court entertaining a given common-law case
would use a civil jury, a federal court hearing the same case (because, say, it involves diverse citizens or raises a federal question) must follow-must 'preserve'-that state-law jury
right.").
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Amendment. The Amendment was never intended to restrict the states'
allocation decisions in their own causes of action, but only to prevent the
federal courts from encroaching on traditional jury-trial rights. Thus, the
Seventh Amendment should not stand in the way of applying state rules
regarding allocation of mixed questions that are bound up with substantive
rights.
This caveat for mixed questions bound up with substantive rights still
leaves room for an independent Byrd test-where the state assigns historical and non-bound-up mixed questions in "legal" claims to the judge. But
even here the federal rule still might not trump the state rule. Recall that
most interpret Byrd as a balancing test involving three factors: the federal
policy in favor of trial by jury, the state interest in having its procedural rule
followed in federal court, and the state/litigant's interest in conformity between state and federal outcomes.253 The balance in Byrd mandated the federal rule because the federal interest was strong, the state interest in its
"form and mode" rule was minimal, and the likelihood of outcome disparity
was low due to the jury-control devices that are available in federal court.254
The same result will not necessarily hold true where a state's interest in its
allocation to the judge is more intense (or more sensitively characterized
than it was in the Byrd opinion) or if there is serious potential for outcome
255
disparity.
What is actual current federal practice in this area (taking into account
all the cases, and not just those cited in Wright and Miller)? No court to this
point appears to have recognized the complex ways that state law may influence the judge-jury allocation in federal court. Instead, the decisions
lurch between instinctive adherence to the state rule and reflexive fealty to
the enclave theory of the judge-jury relationship.
An example is the courts' treatment of the unfair and deceptive trade
practices statute in North Carolina. Soon after it was enacted, the state supreme court held that "[o]rdinarily it would be for the jury to determine the
253.

In a case decided shortly after Byrd, the Court reached a similar conclusion on

similar facts. In Magenau v. Aetna FreightLines, Inc., the district court had followed state

practice and itself decided whether employment was "not in the regular course of business."
360 U.S. 273, 277 (1959). As in Byrd, the Court found that "[w]e have been given no reason
for the distinction in the Pennsylvania practice of trying such disputed factual issues to the
court." Id.at 278. Accordingly, the federal policy in favor of jury determination of the facts
controlled. Justice Frankfurter dissented, pointing out that "no prior federal case would
justify a ruling that in the federal courts application of law to fact is a jury function," nor was
there evidence that such was the practice at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted.
Id.at 282 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
254.

See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 532, 539-40

(1958).
255.
Of course, the state rule will still not control if the Seventh Amendment actually
dictates otherwise.
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facts, and based on the jury's finding, the court would then determine as a
matter of law whether the defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or
' The court did not specify
practices in the conduct of trade or commerce." 256
why it entrusted this mixed question to the judge, but it was likely motivated by a desire to ensure consistent and predictable enforcement of this
257
important, new cause of action. 257 When the Fourth Circuit had to face the
allocation question in an unfair and deceptive trade practices case, it did not
mention Byrd, but simply quoted the language from the North Carolina
opinion verbatim, and held that in federal court, as in state court, the mixed
question is for the judge.258 Here is an obvious example of state law's influence in the judge-jury realm.
Other mixed question cases indicate that federal law is not the monolithic influence that courts and commentators make it out to be. A Third
Circuit case followed state practice in holding that the application of the
probable cause standard in a malicious prosecution case is for the judge,
over a dissent that cited Byrd, and argued that federal law governed. 259 A
recent First Circuit case recognized that the allocation question is at the
very least more complicated than Wright and Miller would have it:
We note that the plaintiffs might have argued-but did
not-that although all of the pertinent facts are undisputed,
the issue should have gone to the jury if the characterization question was a close call. Sometimes, legal questions
are left to the jury in close cases even where all the facts
are undisputed (e.g., whether behavior is negligent) and
sometimes not (e.g., the interpretation of a written document based solely on its language). Whether this "judge
versus jury" issue would be governed by federal or state
law in a diversity case and how it would be treated under
federal or Maine law, are interesting questions but they
need not be resolved in this case. 26

256. Hardy v. Toler, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346-47 (N.C. 1975).
257.
See Louis, supra note 168, at 1035 ("Arguably, the North Carolina Supreme
Court took the crucial determination from the jury to control this remedial menace to the
pocketbooks of local businesses, many of which doubtlessly were unaware of the Act's full
scope, and to achieve consistency in results.").
Ati. Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 715 (4th Cir. 1983).
258.
Thomas v. E. J. Korvette, Inc., 476 F.2d 471, 475-76 (3d Cir. 1973).
259.
Campbell v. Wash. Cty. Tech. Coll., 219 F.3d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2000) (citation
260.
omitted).
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A very recent case from the Fifth Circuit unreflectively held that "[w]hether
a cause of injury is foreseeable is a question for the jury," and cited a Mississippi case in support of that proposition. 261
One Fourth Circuit case comes close to explicitly recognizing one of
my main points: that some allocations are bound up with substantive rights
and must control under Erie's constitutional holding. In Justice v. Pennzoil
Co., the issue was whether a company had made "unreasonable use" of the
surface of a tract of land. 262 West Virginia allocates the mixed question to
the judge. The court held that state practice bound the federal court, despite
Byrd and the "federal policy" in favor of jury trial contained therein:
In contrast [to Byrd], the rule articulated in [West Virginia]
is one of state property law. Unreasonable use of land by a
mineral owner is not measured by the tort standard of the
ordinary reasonable man; rather, it is measured by concrete
legal standards rooted in the common law. It is not a matter
readily susceptible of jury determination. The rule of Adkins is not only bound up with but assures the continuity of
those substantive rights and obligations of the parties which
were defined generations ago.263

In short, because the West Virginia rule was bound up with substantive
rights, it was binding under Erie's constitutional holding.264 This and the
other cases that followed the state rule cited Byrd, yet recognized that state
law influence is consistent with the holding of that case.265
261.
Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 496 (5th Cir. 2008).
262.
598 F.2d 1339, 1341 (4th Cir. 1979).
263.
Id. at 1342-43 (citation omitted).
264.
Judge Posner seemed to accept this concept in a case involving whether judge or
jury should decide whether a contract is divisible. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Rotec
Indus., Inc., 392 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2004). He began by repeating the conventional wisdom:
"[I]n all cases in federal court, including diversity cases, the allocation of responsibility
between judge ('law') and jury ('fact') is governed by federal rather than state law." Id. at
949. But then he qualified that statement: "The line frays, however, when the procedural rule
is generated by a substantive policy; and it is possible to view the fact-law distinction in
contract cases in that light, as designed to reduce contractual transaction costs by allowing
most contract disputes to be resolved without a trial." Id. He did not find it necessary to
resolve the issue in that case. Id.
265.
For district court cases holding that the state allocation controls, see Banks v.
Yokemick, 144 F. Supp. 2d 272, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (following state's allocation of question-whether municipality's refusal to indemnify was arbitrary and capricious-to judge,
relying on Gasperiniand distinguishing Byrd), and Calef v. Fedex Ground Package Sys.,
Inc., 2007 WL 2570185 at *8 (N.D. W. Va. 2007) (holding that because the state court provided a jury where the federal court would not, no Seventh Amendment issue was present
and state practice controlled).
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Unfortunately, other cases, including some from the same circuits, uncritically accept that issue allocation is solely a matter of federal law. For
example, in the First Circuit's Rankin v. Allstate Insurance Co., a Maine
statute provided an insured with attorney's fees and interest of the insurer
"unreasonably delayed" in making payment.266 The Court cited Byrd and
held that "juries in federal court usually decide whether conduct was 'reasonable.' . . . Under the Seventh Amendment, it would not matter whether
Maine courts gave such issues to the judge. 267 The Court therefore did not
even inquire into state practice or the reasons for it.
In the Third Circuit's Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., the district
court held that the discovery rule exception to the statute of limitations was
a question for the judge, and even set forth some substantive reasons for the
allocation.268 Yet the appellate court disregarded the state practice, on the
authority of Byrd, and committed it to the jury. 269 The dissent in the case
made my point-that an allocation bound up with substantive rights binds
under the constitutional holding (and also noted that divergence disserves
the twin aims of Erie).27 °
Finally, a recent case from the First Circuit, citing Byrd, held that the
state practice, of submitting the question of whether a contract is integrated
to the judge, does not bind a federal court. 271 This, despite the fact that allocation of mixed questions to the judge in contract cases, has a wellestablished normative rationale-to ensure that the norms of commercial
behavior, and not popular morality, determine whether liability is warranted.
These decisions are not necessarily wrong; frankly, there is not enough
discussion of the relevant state rules to decide whether they were bound up,
raised a constitutional question, or should be controlling under the Byrd
balancing test. But the reasoning is at best incomplete. The argument set out
in this section-as well as the federal cases cited above that apply the state
rule-puts the lie to the notion that allocation is solely a matter of federal
law. In fact, a court should ask four different questions when confronting a
state law issue allocation:
1.
If the state allocates to the jury, then no further inquiry is
needed. So long as divergence would violate twin aims
(as it normally will), the state rule controls.

266.
267.

268.
269.

336 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2003).

Id. at 15 n.5.

534 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 573.

270.
Id. at 575, 577 (Rosenn, J., concurring and dissenting).
271.
Cf. Marcoux v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 524 F.3d 33, 44 n.10 (1st Cir. 2008)
(reaching the same result, however, under federal law).
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2.

3.

4.

If the claim is clearly equitable and the state allocates to
the judge, the Byrd constitutional avoidance canon does
not apply, and state law should control if the twin-aims
test is met.
If the state allocates a mixed question to the judge, and
the allocation is bound up with substantive rights, then
the state rule controls as a matter of constitutional law,
unless the Seventh Amendment requires otherwise.
Finally, if none of these is true, the Byrd test may apply,
but might still indicate use of the state rule under certain
circumstances.
IV. CONCLUSION

In the last two Parts, I have hopefully succeeded in demonstrating the
real and substantial state and litigant interests that are at play in the area of
judge-jury rules. Though sufficiency and issue allocation are by no means
the only significant judge-jury issues, they show that an unthinking adherence to the enclave theory of judge-jury relations has substantial inequitable
consequences and is not warranted by existing case law. State rules of sufficiency and allocation often involve powerful state interests, sometimes of
federal constitutional magnitude. And failing to follow these state rules
produces substantial unfairness for litigants, generating a substantial likelihood of forum-shopping and inequity, in violation of the twin aims of Erie
as explicated in Hanna.
There is no good reason why Byrd should be invoked to resist application of these state rules. Byrd, conceived as a competing test with Hanna
twin aims, is problematic as a matter of theory and also requires an unworkable essentialism. Gasperini complicated the picture even further by
refusing to use Byrd to analyze a state rule that crucially impacted the
judge-jury relationship. The only way to harmonize the decisions is to say
that Byrd is no different from the Hanna test, or at most, that it provides a
separate test that enables the avoidance of difficult Seventh Amendment
questions.
In either case, Hanna will apply to many state judge-jury rules, and
mandate adherence in federal diversity cases. The widespread influence that
state rules have in the actual cases-the ones not cited by Wright and
Miller-confirms that this must be so. It is time for the courts and the treatise makers to acknowledge that state law should have meaningful influence
on the judge-jury relationship in federal court.

